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Abstract
A growing contingent of U.S. policymakers and politicians are embracing the idea
of youth boot camps service to address failings of our criminal, educational, and
social systems. This idea is predicated on the belief that a residential program of
physical labor, remedial education, and inspirational guidance, will enable "at risk"
youth to overcome their troubled histories and successfully reintegrate into society.
A phalanx within this youth service advocacy is convinced that the military ought to
play an active part in this scheme. Proponents argue that the military has both the
material infrastructure and the available manpower resources to successfully mount
such an effort. They cite historical examples, such as the Civilian Conservation
Corps and Project 100,000, as proof that the military is, indeed, capable of
"rescuing" and "salvaging" "at-risk" youth.
This thesis seeks to debunk this widely-accepted myth, and to demonstrate that past
attempts to force the military to adopt youth-oriented social missions have been
anything but the emulation-worthy successes their champions claim. This thesis
examines past and current military-youth programs, and analyzes the effects these
programs have had on both the military and prog;am prticipants. This thesis then
explores the question of why these programs remain so timelessly attractive, even
in the face of failure. Finally, this thesis makes a number of recommendations
about the feasibility and, ultimately, the desirability of modern military-youth
programs.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Harvey M. Sapolsky
Title: Professor of Public Policy and Organization, Dept. of Political Science
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I. Introduction
Relying on the military to solve domestic problems has great political
appeal. To many legislators and policymakers, the military looks the ideal
instrument for correcting many of the structural failures-socioeducational and
socioeconomic--that now confront American society. With its unique
infrastructure, the U.S. military is capable of deploying and managing resources,
human and material, on a scale scarcely imaginable by most civilian organizations.
For instance, the U.S. military's unrivaled airlift, sealift, and prepositioning
capabilities allow them to provide disaster assistance and humanitarian relief
across the country and around the globe, faster and more efficiently than any
civilian organization. 1 At a time when domestic social crises are growing in size
and scope, the unparalleled logistical and organizational skills of the U.S. military
make it look ever more attractive as a tool for redressing social problems.
One crisis area in which the proposed use of the military has gained
currency of late, is that of "at-risk" youth--the often impoverished, alienated, and
undereducated juveniles that make up an ever-growing segment of American
society. The rationale behind such proposals is that the military, an organization
with an acknowledged track record of "turning boys into men," offers discipline,
direction, and the opportunity to develop vocational skills in an environment
designed to build confidence and self-esteem; Moreover, since the military has
long been an attractive career avenue for the underprivileged, it is seen as uniquely
suited to act as a catalyst for turning around the lives of these wayward juveniles.
Now, in the wake of the Cold War, the availability of surplus resources and
underutilized military facilities have enhanced the pressure placed on the military to
1 For example, the relief effort in South Florida, after Hurricane Andrew, was in complete disarray before
the U.S. military took over. Similarly, following Desert Storm, U.S. troops were instrumental in saving
the Kurds in Northern Iraq.
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assume this non-traditional mission.2 However, though the circumstances
engendered by the end of the superpower struggle may be unique, programs aimed
at using the military in youth development schemes are neither new nor novel.
Rather, the genesis of such proposals can be traced back to social activists of the
Progressive Era, such as William James, who, in 1906, proposed a mandatory
period of national service, a period of arduous manual labor that would instill the
"military ideals of hardihood and discipline," while knocking the childishness out
of America's "gilded youth," "sending them back into society with healthier
sympathies and soberer ideas."3
Such ideas still have great resonance with policy makers today, though the
basis of their appeal varies. For some policymakers, many of whom served in the
military themselves,4 enthusiasm for military involvement grows out of a nostalgia
for a memorable and meaningful experience in their youth. For others, it stems
from a principled belief that military basic training can cause lasting behavioral
change. If the military values of discipline, hard work, and esprit de corps "made
men" out of them; they intuitively surmise that similar exposure will have the same
effect on today's youth.
It is this "intuitive understanding" of the benefits of military service that
makes these proposals so timelessly attractive. For the enthusiasm for such
programs we are witnessing in the wake of the Cold War is merely part of a
recurring 30-year cycle of such advocacy, not something unique to our "peace
2 Such pressure has been further enhanced by the rise of violence in America's inner-cities. For instance,
responding to the Los Angeles riots, Senator Sam Nunn has proposed the "Domestic Action Program,"
which envisions using the military to help staunch the deterioration of our urban infrastructure, address the
dearth of appropriate role models for inner-city youths, and provide training and educational opportunities
for the disadvantaged. [See FY93 SASC Appropriation Bill for details.]
3 Ondaajte, E. H., Policy Options for Army Involvement in Youth Development, [a RAND report], Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, p. 19.
4 The number of politicians and policy makers who have military experience, while still high, is
diminishing rapidly as a new generation of public figures takes the political stage. A great number of
"baby boomers," including our President, escaped military service, either because of Vietnam-era draft
evasion, or because of the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force in the early 1970s, which allowed
many to eschew the military experience that was de rigeur a generation earlier.
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dividend" hungry post-Cold War populace. Three decades after William James'
call for the formation of a youth military service, Roosevelt's New Deal Civilian
Conservation Corps plan was enthusiastically adopted. In the midst of the Great
Depression, the U.S. Army was called upon to use its troops to feed, clothe, and
shelter the nation's idle [and for the most part, underprivileged] youth. Then, in the
1960s, as part of Johnson's "Great Society," Project 100,000 was inaugurated.
This program represented yet another attempt to exploit the unique resources of the
military to "uplift" the disadvantaged from the perils of poverty and ignorance; in
this case, by allowing poverty-stricken low-aptitude recruits to enter the ranks.
Thirty years later, we now have, among other proposals, the National Guard-run,
Project ChalleNGe, which relies on the military to "rescue" high school dropouts
through a residential program of education and societal reintegration.
At first glance, we might expect the military to be enthusiastic proponents of
contemporary proposals. As bureaucracy theorists Morton Halperin and J.Q.
Wilson tell us, organizations seek to avoid decreases in their size, wealth, and
autonomy, while, simultaneously, seeking to reduce organizational uncertainty. 5 In
an era when budget cutbacks inexorably threaten each of these organizational
imperatives, the obvious choice might seem to be organizational transmutation and
the adoption of these new missions. By embracing non-traditional missions, the
services would presumably stave off threats to their organizational livelihood. Yet,
with the exception of the National Guard,6 the military has rigorously resisted
embracing these youth development schemes.
5 Allison, G.T., Essence of Decision, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1967, p. 82 and p. 84.; [See
also Wilson, J. Q., Bureaucracy and Weber, M., Bureaucracy.]
6 One caveat, however. Though these new missions are officially embraced by the National Guard, it is not
clear that they are universally espoused by all members of the Guard. On the other hand, it should also be
noted that, among active-duty personnel, youth development proposals do have some, albeit few,
champions.
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For the truth is, while adopting this new role would temporarily reduce
pressure on the military as an institution, it would ultimately, and more insidiously,
lead to organizational degradation from within. Distracting the military from its
principal role as "an organization that exists to apply violence," 7 threatens to impair
future operational readiness by diverting resources and energies away from primary
missions, thus leaving our troops ill-prepared to fight. As Colonel C.J. Dunlap
portends, "Each moment spent performing a non-traditional mission is one
unavailable for orthodox military exercises. We should. . recognize this grave
risk." 8
Moreover, forcing the military to assume missions outside of its defined
mandate may lead to the erosion of the military's unique "organizational culture." 9
The U.S. military has been especially successful as an organization because its
"culture" is particularly trenchant and deep-rooted Compelling the military to adopt
missions that lie outside of this culture may erode morale and "sense of mission,"
which, Wilson asserts, is critical to organizational effectiveness. This "sense of
mission" confers a feeling of special worth on the organization's members,
provides a basis for recruiting and socializing new members, and enables those in
leadership positions to economize on the use of incentives.10
Thus, though organizations do strive to preserve their size and wealth, they
do so only to the extent that such actions to not threaten their organizational identity.
Faced with trade-offs between size and identity, organizations will likely choose to
shrink, rather than adopt unwanted missions because, by sacrificing autonomy and
7 Huntington, S., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1957), p. 11.
8 Dunlap, Col. C. J., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22, Winter
1992/1993, p. 11. "The Origins .. ." is a satirical look at the potential effect of non-traditional missions
on the U.S. military. Though Dunlap's tale is fictive, many of the premises upon which the story is built
are real.
9 See Wilson, Chapter 6.; "Organizational culture" is roughly defined as a persistent, patterned way of
thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.
10 See Wilson, Chapter 6.
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identity to preserve size and wealth, organizations may precipitate their own
destruction. In short, accepting the youth development mission demands a trade-
off our military will not freely make.
This thesis Will argue that, whateverthe seemingly obvious merits of such
youth development proposals, they are, at best, costly diversions better left to
civilian agencies and organizations. At worst, they threaten to diminish combat
effectiveness and thrust the military into the realm of domestic politics, which could
impair civil-military relations, and result in the unwelcome intrusion of the military
into the U.S. domestic political debate."
Moreover, as examination of the Civilian Conservation Corps, Project
100,000 and contemporary programs will show, when the military has been
enlisted as social reformer, it has been ineffective in achieving its goals. The very
strength of its organizational culture prevents the military from being an effective
social tool; tasks that are not viewed as part of the military's culture are not attended
to with the same energy and resources as tasks that are seen as integral to it.12
While the military has indisputably been more than proficient at managing
the logistical demands placed upon it, this thesis will illustrate that it has failed in its
mission to rehabilitate "at-risk" youth. Despite the glow that surrounds past
programs, this thesis will demonstrate that these seemingly stunning successes are
far more tarnished than their mythologizing champions would have us believe. We
must resist the intoxicating option of deploying our military to solve problems better
left to civilian organizations. Neither America's military nor America's youth can
afford the alternative.
11 Rosenau, W., "Non-traditional Missions and the Future of the U.S. Military," The Fletcher Forum of
World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter/Spring, 1994, p. 65.
12 See Wilson, Chapter 6.
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II. Unlearned Lessons from the Past
The Civilian Conservation Corps
The Civilian Conservation Corps [CCC] began as the brainchild of
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and combined Roosevelt's desire to relieve
unemployment with his long-stated interest in conservation.l 2 At the same time,
the CCC also curtailed urban unrest by "removfing] large numbers of able-bodied
military-age men from the ranks of potential mobs in an hour of national
desperation."13 The CCC lasted from the early months of Roosevelt's presidency
in Spring 1933 to June 1942. Over this nine-year period, nearly three million
single, unemployed men, between the ages of 17 and 28, were enrolled for an
average stay of approximately ten months. Those who volunteered for the program
were ranked according to their level of neediness and were chosen based upon the
number of slots at each camp and their level of need.' 4 Volunteers received free
food, shelter, clothing, and a monthly stipend of $30, over 80% of which was sent
directly to the enrollee's family.' 5
Though Roosevelt's original plan called for only limited military
involvement, the War Department was ultimately given responsibility for managing
the residential work camps. As first envisioned, the Army was only supposed to
enroll and process recruits, put them through a two-week physical conditioning
12 Even before becoming president, Roosevelt had displayed a strong interest in both youth service and
conservation. For instance, as governor of New York, Roosevelt initiated a state reforestation program for
jobless young men, a kind of mini-CCC. [For details, see Sherradan, M., "Military Participation in a
Youth Employment Program," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 1981, p. 227 and The
Civilian Conservation Corps, Final Report.]
1 3 Griffith, Jr., R. K., Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: America's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army
Between the World Wars, Contributions in Military History, Number 27, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1982, p. 132.; It is, perhaps, the parallels that can be drawn with our own age that invite continual
comparison between the CCC and contemporary proposals. While we are not currently in the throes of a
depression, it is the violence [and fear of violence] in the inner city that drives many current proposals.
14 Of those chosen for the CCC, only ten percent had completed high school, eight percent were African-
American, and most came from rural backgrounds. [See Forging a Military Youth Corps: A Military-
Youth Service Partnership for High School Dropouts, (The Final Report of the CSIS National Community
Service for Out-of-School Youth Project), Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1992, p. 25.]
15 Sherradan, M., "Military Participation in a Youth Employment Program: The Civilian Conservation
Corps," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 1981, p. 227.
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program, and transport them to camps that were to be managed by the Forest
Service. Roosevelt had hoped to have 250,000 enrollees in the camps by July 1,
1933. When it became obvious that this task would prove too formidable for the
civilian organizations in charge, the War Department was asked to assume a greater
share of the project.
Despite its alacrity in conducting such operations, the Army was clearly not
anxious to assume responsibility for the CCC camps. The General Staff believed
the CCC represented an "inappropriate diversion of limited military manpower to
civilian purposes."1 6 Then Chief of Staff, Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of
War, George Dem--both deeply concerned about the future allocation of resources
to the Army--finally agreed to accept the expanded role when they realized the
utility of making their organization indispensable to the Roosevelt plan. In addition
to the resource potential of such an arrangement, neither man could have
overlooked the potential use of CCC enrollees as a reserve force, or at least a
recruiting pool, for the regular Army. 17
By all accounts, the Army did a remarkable job in establishing the first
major New Deal unemployment relief effort. Initially, the Army diverted virtually
every available resource to the CCC: service schools, ROTC, and civilian military
training summer camps, Reserve and National Guard training camps, and regular
units within the United States were all stripped of both regular and non-
commissioned officers. Likewise, military supplies, vehicles, and equipment were
sent to the training and work camps. By the July 1 target date, nearly 220,000 men
were enrolled in nearly 1,300 camps. 18 It is highly unlikely that this mobilization
16 ibid., p. 228, During the Hoover administration the War Deparmceirt ad expressed similar reluctance to
assume a much smaller burden in the form of a military training camp program for civilians. [See also
Rosenau, p. 40]
17 Griffith, p. 133.
18 War Department Annual Reports 1933 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 6.
These figures are fuzzy as sources vary in their estimations of both number of enrollees and number of
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could have been accomplished so swiftly and efficiently in the absence of an
organization specifically designed for [and experienced in] assembling,
transporting, housing, clothing, and feeding thousands of men on short notice.
"The CCC mobilization was the most rapid large-scale manpower mobilization in
the nation's history--more rapid than even the selection and deployment of men at
the beginning of World War I."'9
The Impact of the CCC on the Army
In spite of their initial reticence, military involvement in the CCC did provide the
Army with a few tangible rewards. Command of a CCC camp gave junior officers
experience in managing men and resources in a manner similar to that they would
acquire commanding a small military unit. Since there were too few units in the
peacetime army for every officer to obtain command experience, the CCC offered
an appealing alternative. It has even been argued that command of a CCC camp
provided training superior to that offered in the military arena; the prohibition on
military discipline in the camps meant that officers learned "to govern men by
leadership, explanation, and diplomacy rather than discipline."20 Thus CCC
discipline was "based on respect for authority, not fear of it."21 Ultimately, more
than sixty thousand officers were trained through their association with the CCC. 2 2
As they settled into their role as program administrators, the Army General
Staff began to view the CCC as a possible source of an enlisted reserve. This idea
was to prove problematic, however, since the General Staff was very concerned
that it not expose itself to the charges of militarism that would surely follow
camps; the Sherradan article, for example, asserts that "by early July, 275,000 enrollees were settled in
1,468 forest and park camps in every state in the nation." (Sherradan, p. 230)
19 Sherradan, p. 230.
20 Rosenau, p. 42.
21 The Civilian Conservation Corps, Final Report, p. 63
22 Sherradan, p. 240.
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advocacy of such a scheme. So sensitive was the Army to this issue that when the
National Rifle Association proposed recreational shooting at CCC camps, and even
offered to provide the arms and ammunition, the War Department felt obliged to
reject the offer.2 3
In 1935, MacArthur proposed that CCC enrollees be given the option of
volunteering for two months of military training upon expiration of their service in
the Corps. Upon completion of "basic" training, the enrollee would then be entitled
to join an auxiliary enlisted reserve. Introduced as a bill in the House Military
Affairs Committee, MacArthur's plan drew severe criticism, and perished swiftly.
Admonished, thereafter the Army shunned all plans that might invite accusations
that they were militarizing the CCC, even those suggested by civilians.24
On the face of it, the CCC appears to be "one of the most amazing social
action successes ever registered by the federal government, "2 5 as its supporters
gleefully recount. Nearly three million men were rescued from the unemployment
lines--fed, clothed, and housed. At the same time, the Army was able to train tens
of thousands of its officers, while simultaneously (though passively) creating the
basic foundations of the U.S. forces that would eventually serve in World War II.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals flaws in this seemingly clear success.
First, in many respects, the existence of the CCC actively harmed, rather
than aided, the military in the mid- 1930s and during the buildup before World War
II. As mentioned above, the Army's role in the CCC sidetracked regular officers
from troop duty and professional schooling, as well as Reserve and National Guard
training and inspection assignments. In addition, military supplies that should have
23 Griffith, p. 134.
24 ibid.; Criticism erupted from, among other places, the Committee on Militarism in Education (an
antimilitary organization), which vigorously opposed the idea and demanded the complete withdrawal of the
Army from all CCC activities.
25 Weeks, C., Jobs Corps: Dollars and Dropouts, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967,
p. 5.
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been stockpiled for use in wartime were instead used to support CCC camp
prerogatives. Likewise, fresh recruits who should have been training for combat
missions (the Army's "real" job) were instead relegated to maintenance and other
chores that would prove of little relevance on the battlefield.
Second, and more importantly, "the success of the CCC and the modest
benefits of the New Deal relief and recovery efforts undermined the Army's ability
to attract and retain good enlisted men for the rest of the depression."2 6 FDR's
Administration had simultaneously cut the pay of enlisted men by 15 percent (in
order to reduce government spending), while providing 250,000 CCC employees
with a rate of pay higher than that of Army privates. As the Army and Navy
Journal was fond of disdainfully noting, "Army privates received $17.85 per
month while CCC enrollees were paid $30 a month."27 Thus, for an approximately
fifty percent smaller salary, Army privates were expected to die for their country,
while CCC enrollees had only to be willing and able to toil in the woods.
In January 1934, during Congressional budget hearings, Major General
James F. McKinley, the adjutant general, conveyed to the committee that intimate
contact between regular enlisted soldiers and CCC enrollees had produced
considerable discontent among the former due to the pay differential. The General
presented a CCC inspection report that stated in part:
The enlisted men have generally displayed a commendatory loyalty and a
willingness to work long hours at difficult task, and great credit is due to them.
There is, however, an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, due to the unfavorable
comparison of their pay with that of the enrollees and the greater solicitude
shown for the Civilian Conservation Corps members. There is some indication
that desertions have increased and reenlistments have fallen off. 28
In addition, not only did the pay differential discourage enlistments, it also
adversely affected the morale of the peacetime army. By offering CCC civilian
14
26 Griffith, p. 158.
27 ibid.
28 ibid., p. 160.
volunteers a higher rate of pay and less demanding employment, the government
effectively contributed to the erosion of the military's organizational culture, and left
members of the army feeling undervalued and exploited.
Third, the absorption of hundreds of thousands of military age men into the
CCC proved to be a drain on potential manpower prospects. With the Fiscal Year
1936 budget came Congressional approval to expand the Army's enlisted strength
to 165,000 men. But when the recruitment drive commenced on July 1, 1935, the
New York Times noted that the White House had put the CCC enrollees off limits
to recruiters. "Roosevelt made it clear that he did not want the CCC used as a
'feeder' for the military services." 29 Obviously, the manpower bonus previously
anticipated by the General Staff were not to be realized.
Clearly, the military did not derive the expected benefits from their foray
into the arena of social welfare. Though they were able to train a greater number of
their officers than would have otherwise been possible, CCC duty also sidetracked
many officers from duties that would prove much more relevant at the start of
World War II. Proponents like to argue that though CCC recruits were not given
military training per se, their exposure to the military in the camps made those who
went on to fight in WWII better soldiers. However, I have seen no data that
conclusively supports such a claim. Thus, it seems that the diversion of military
officers into the CCC did more harm than good in terms of operational readiness.
Moreover, the CCC further eroded U.S. military capabilities by diminishing
the Army's ability to retain its troops, since the benefits offered by the CCC were
superior to the remuneration offered to soldiers. This pay differential also created
some discordance between those in the Army and their CCC counterparts, thus
adversely affecting morale within the ranks. Finally, the CCC proved to be a drain
on manpower resources since CCC graduates were not allowed to be considered as
15
29 ibid., p. 163.
part of a recruitment pool for the military. Thus it seems, the Army had ample
reason to resist this non-traditional mission; they had little to gain and much to lose
from its implementation.
The CCC and Civilian Society
The nonmilitary impact of the CCC is also less stunning than its champions
would have us believe. Fifty years after its demise, the CCC continues to garner
praise. Many view it as an archetype for government programs with similar goals.
Those who sing the praises of the current favorite, Project ChalleNGe, liken it to
the CCC. They claim it, too, will provide a glimmer of hope for disadvantaged
youth, through employment of a residential program of manual labor, coupled with
the benefits of discipline offered by military supervision.
However, despite the halo of praise that surrounds the CCC, some
detractors do exist. One critic cites emergency conditions, an oppressive
authoritarian command structure, and [high] desertion and discharge rates as proof
that the program is not worthy of emulation. He further suggests that "the CCC did
not improve to any appreciable degree the living conditions and morale of the young
men who participated."3 0
Which perspective one chooses depends in large part, of course, upon the
criteria by which the program is judged. To its credit, the CCC did manage to feed,
clothe, and house nearly three million men in the midst of a national crisis.3 1
However, as the program is being evoked today, the use of CCC-like boot camps
would seem to be an unequivocally successful method by which to uplift America's
underclasses. As we shall see below, the program was far from triumphant in this
respect.
30 Sherradan, p. 244.
31 By one count. Different authors use differentnumbers, but generally the reported total number of
participants lies between 2,500,000 and three million men.
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Seemingly the best way to judge the worth of CCC-like programs would be
to measure the long-term effects of the CCC experience on enrollees' socio-
economic and academic achievements. Unfortunately, such an analysis is
something most CCC enthusiasts have failed to do. For instance, one of the
program's most ardent proponents, Michael Sherradan, has written a number of
books and articles on the CCC, and has even created a complex model with which
he claims to have proven the "success" of the CCC. 32 Yet Sherradan's data offers
absolutely no information about the educational or socio-economic status of CCC
enrollees after program completion. Since contemporary analyses of similar
programs have persuasively shown that the post-residential period is the most
crucial interval in evaluating program success, the lack of any such analysis casts
doubt on the validity of Sherradan's effusive claims about the CCC.3 3
Another study of the CCC, conducted by J. A. Salmond, does address,
though only informally, the issue of enrollee background, program experiences,
and subsequent histories.34 Though Salmond's data is, as noted, incomplete, it is
nonetheless revealing. The study indicates that while some Caucasian enrollees
may have benefited socio-economically from their time in the CCC, the program
was far from equally propitious for other racial groups. The 1933 act creating the
CCC contained this clause: "That in employing citizens for the purpose of this Act,
no discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, and creed."3 5 Though
the intent behind the inclusion such a clause was obviously the protection of the
32 [See Sherradan, M., "Military Participation in a Youth Employment Program: The Civilian
Conservation Corps," for a detailed description of his model and methodology.]
33 This information was obtained in a telephone interview with youth advocate, Wade Galling, Senior
Program Officer of Public/Private Ventures, May 1993. Much of Gatling's research is devoted to
formulation and analysis of feasibility models of youth programs.
34 However, a thorough, formal evaluation which measures true participant "success" rates has yet to be
undertaken. [Program proponents may fear the results would prove counter-productive to their advocacy.]
35 Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study, Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1967, p. 88
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rights of minorities, mere words did little to insure that equal benefits were, in fact,
bestowed on all participants by the newly created agency.
In the midst of the Depression, unemployment rates for African-Americans
were double the national average, and the percentage of African-Americans on
welfare was twice their proportion of the population. Therefore, Federal relief
schemes like the CCC were even more imperative for unemployed minorities than
they were for whites. Yet, enrollee selection had scarcely commenced when reports
began to trickle in that local selection agents were deliberately excluding African-
Americans from all CCC activities.36
A plethora of excuses emerged to account for this phenomena. The majority
of CCC camps were segregated (by necessity, officials argued), and so in areas
where there were not enough non-whites to fill a camp, no minorities were
accepted. Though the NAACP and other organizations lobbied for greater
representation, for the most part, their complaints were ignored.
Much of the responsibility for enrollment restrictions must lie with local
communities that refused to host minority camps, although some blame remains
with the Administration. Roosevelt made no attempt to insure fairer treatment for
African-Americans, and had, himself, agreed to the restriction of their enrollment.3 7
In addition, towards the end of the CCC's tenure, when camps began to close, one
minority camp was shut down each time a Caucasian camp closed. Although on the
face of it this closure policy seems equitable, in absolute terms, this rapid
drawdown proved much more devastating to minorities than to whites. In other
words, though minorities required the benefits offered by the CCC more than
whites did [in the aggregate], they lost these benefits as quickly as [or faster than]
did whites.
18
36 ibid, p. 88.
37 ibid, p. 100.
Nonetheless, as CCC proponents like to point out, over its nine year life
span, the CCC enrolled between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000 men, of which nearly
200,000 were African-American. Although this may very roughly reflect their
absolute numbers in American society at that time, such an assessment fails to take
account of the fact that a greater percentage of these men needed the opportunities
offered by the CCC more than other, more generally affluent groups.
In addition, conditions at the segregated camps were often not on par with
those at "white" camps. For example, though educational training was spotty (at
best) for all enrollees, minority camps often focused training on areas deemed
"Negro jobs." Many left the CCC to become gardeners, poultry farmers, or cooks;
more were placed by CCC officials as janitors, table waiters, or chauffeurs. 38 In
an era when employment was scarce these may have seemed like acceptable
alternatives. However, in retrospect, it is disturbing that even when providing
training and educational opportunities to minorities, administrators were careful not
to provide them with training that might make them skilled enough to compete for
jobs traditionally held by whites.
In short, heralding the CCC as the premier example of how residential work
camps have been used to improve the plight of the underprivileged is absurd.
Granting that racial attitudes and public policies have changed since the 1930s, it is
nonetheless ironic that contemporary proponents should feel compelled to model
their proposals for programs designed to ameliorate racial and income inequalities
on a project so obviously perverted with these same inequities.
Another method by which to gauge the success of the CCC is through
measurement of enrollee satisfaction, and one way to assess "satisfaction" is
through the behavioral measure of dropout and expulsion rates. According to
Sherradan's data, 11 percent of CCC enrollees "deserted," and an additional six
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38 ibid, p. 101.
percent received "non-honorable discharges." 3 9 Salmond's study, on the other
hand, presents a much bleaker picture. Although the dropout/dismissal rate did
hover around 11 percent for the first several years of camp operation, by April
1937, 18.8 percent of all enrollees who left the CCC camps were dishonorably
discharged for desertion. By December 1938, the desertion rate was higher than 20
percent. "In other words, by 1939, one out of every five discharged enrollees
severed his connection with the camps illegally." 40 Desertion cost the CCC dearly,
in money as well as prestige, because it meant that food, clothing, and training had
all been squandered. Although the program was immensely popular at its
inception, by 1942 there was widespread repudiation of the CCC; a Gallup Poll
indicates that by April of that year, 54 percent of those queried thought the program
should be abolished. 4 1
Furthermore, in the area of greatest significance with respect to
contemporary programs, education, the CCC also fared poorly. Even proponent
Sherradan notes, "No observer, with the possible exception of the CCC director of
education, has concluded that programmed education in CCC camps was especially
successful." 42 Education and vocational training were at best subsidiary goals to
be achieved by the Army and, despite outside pressure from some Congressmen
and academicians, classroom teaching and formal job training never received much
emphasis. Neither President Roosevelt nor CCC Director Fechner ever viewed the
CCC as an educational program. Fechner said at one point, "The prime purpose of
the CCC [i]s to furnish work and to conserve natural resources... These cannot be
work camps and educational camps at the same time." 43
39 Sherrdan, p. 232.
40 Salmond, p. 181.
41 Gallup Polls, 1942.
42 Sherradan, p. 235
43 ibid.
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In spite of this tepid bureaucratic support, an educational program was
eventually created, most likely to provide jobs for unemployed teachers and other
white collar workers. Anecdotal evidence suggests, not surprisingly, that these
educational advisors were less than fully dedicated to their work. "Several boys
remarked that the advisor was more ready to talk sports than vocational guidance,
while several others said with some resentment that the only time he [the advisor]
showed much interest was 'when the corps area education director came for
inspection.' "44 In short, most of the education obtained by CCC enrollees was
simple vocational training and probably took place on the job.
The results of this vocational training were mixed. The CCC proved to be a
notable success with illiterates; in FY 1938 alone, 8,445 enrollees were taught to
read and write, and 763 were awarded college scholarships. Likewise, despite the
fact that vocational facilities were inadequate, the CCC still managed to produce
4,500 truck drivers, 7,500 bridge builders, 2,000 bakers, and 1,500 welders a
year.4 5 On the other hand, a great deal of training undertaken by enrollees proved
useless. For instance, academic courses were often taken by enrollees who found
little use for their new found knowledge after they left the CCC. Similarly, urban
youths were often trained to dig ditches and clear forests--skills that would prove
superfluous upon return to an urban environment.
This points to yet another inadequacy of the CCC program--little or no
provision was made to find jobs for new graduates. Many returned to the welfare
rolls after leaving the camps; only the wartime build-up and mobilization helped to
reemploy the majority of these young people.4 6 As Sherradan notes "the army
44 Walker, H., The CCC Through the Eyes of 272 Boys, Cleveland, OH: Western Reserve University
Press, 1938, p. 54.
45 Salmond, p. 168.
4 6 This does not bode well for current youth development proposals. Alhough most contemporary
programs include mentorship provisions and placement assistance, few long term jobs exist to satisfy the
needs of enrollees, few of whom, newly armed with their G.E.D.s, have any practical experience, and many
of whom have criminal records.
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cannot realistically be faulted for its unhelpful stance--education was not a genuine
goal of the CCC, and the army, if anything, had a mandate from the president to
keep it that way." 47
Keeping all of these factors in mind, we must ask if the CCC should still be
heralded as a grand success story, a paragon to be held up as evidence that military-
style boot camps are a worthwhile mission for the military and a proven method of
salvaging "at-risk" youth. With respect to the military, the answer is clearly no.
The Army stood to lose far more than it stood to gain from its involvement in this
social experiment. Only the advent of World War II and the accompanying build-
up allowed the Army to overcome the manpower barriers put in its way by the
CCC. Furthermore, the military clearly did not want this mission, and surely we
should certainly question the rationale of employing a reluctant caretaker for [and
rehabilitator of] the nation's troubled youth. Perhaps enrollees themselves put it
best: "'The CCC was a job handed off on the army' and the real army men
'showed that they did not like it in the way they acted."' Another complained, "The
second lieutenant was a general nuisance, he had too many inspections, his whole
emphasis was on the Army set-up; with him the Army came first."48
Next, we must ask, whatever its effect on the military, did the CCC
successfully accomplish its social mission? If feeding, housing, and clothing three
million men over a nine year period qualifies as success, then the answer is yes. If
some more informative objective criteria are applied, the prognosis is far less
optimistic. While some enrollees clearly profited from their CCC service, whites
clearly benefited more than blacks. Likewise, though enrollees, white and black,
found skills acquired through the CCC helpful, in most cases they were of
47 Sherradan, p. 235.
48 Walker, p. 52. [See also Wilson, Bureaucracy, Chapter 6.] Recall that, as Wilson suggests, tasks that
are not part of the organizational culture will not be attended to with the same energy and resources as those
that clearly are.
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ephemeral value. The advent of World War II and the employment opportunities
that came with it proved to be of much greater import to these men than their CCC
training. In the realm of education, though the CCC was not a total failure, it was
hardly the stunning success current proponents would have us believe. It is
interesting to note that, in his book The Moral Equivalent of War?, Sherradan notes
that one of the key reasons for CCC success was that "various youth development
objectives were not allowed to intrude on the major goals of conservation work and
economic support"-- ironic when one considers that it is precisely youth
development programs which supposedly so closely link the CCC with modem
camp proposals.4 9
Through the CCC, "Roosevelt brought together two wasted resources, the
young men and the land, in an attempt to save both."50 Whether or not he
ultimately succeeded is still a matter of debate.
"McNamara's Millions" or "McNamara's Morons"?
Three decades later, the military was once again called upon to act as a
rehabilitator and remedial educator of America's disadvantaged youth. In the early
1960s, each year about a third of the 1.8 million 18 year-olds who took the Armed
Forces Qualification Test [AFQT] 5 1 were judged unfit for service because, 52
according to then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, "they [were] victims
of faulty education or inadequate health services."53 Of these 600,000,
4 9 Eberly, D. and Sherradan, M., [eds.], The Moral Equivalent of War?, New York: Greenwood Press,
1990, p. 117.
50 Salmond, J., p. 4.
51 Since 1950, this test has been given to enlistees and (until 1973) was also given to draftees to aid in
the recruit and dfaftee selection process.
52 Laurence, J., & Ramsberger, P., Low-Aptitude Men in the Military: Who Profits, Who Pays?, New
York, NY: Praeger Publishing Company, 1991, p. 15.
53 Shapley, D., Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert S. McNamara, Boston, MA: Little
Brown and Company, 1993, p. 384.
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approximately half failed due to aptitude deficits. In September 1963, President
John F. Kennedy established the Task Force on Manpower Conservation to tackle
the problem of these myriad young men, enlistees and draftees alike, deemed unfit
to serve.
The task force published their report, aptly titled One-Third of a Nation,
after examining Selective Service records regarding draftee rejection rates and
conducting a nationwide survey of rejected enlistees. This rather bleak study told a
dismal tale about the state of a significant share of American youth. "Two out of
five rejectees had dropped out of school to support their families or themselves;
three out of ten were not working, and of those working, three out of four had
unskilled, semiskilled, or service jobs." 5 4 As a normative measure, the report also
made recommendations and proposed solutions. Among the committee's
recommendations was a proposal that young men receive their pre-induction
examinations as soon as they turned eighteen. Those with correctable medical
problems could then be quickly identified and "cured," while youths rejected due to
aptitude deficits would receive counseling and assistance in meeting their
educational and vocational needs. The task force believed that these efforts, in
conjunction with already existing Federal programs, would do much to ameliorate
this "skills" problem. The task force's report, however, made no suggestion that
the Department of Defense (DOD), or any of the services, should assume any role
in this effort.
However, Secretary of Defense McNamara (himself, a task force member)
had other ideas, and soon after Johnson took office, McNamara began to fashion
means by which his Department could play a role in fighting the newly declared
War on Poverty. His first attempt, the Special Training Enlistment Program
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5 4 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 15.
[STEP]55, was opposed by Congress, which in the 1960s, still believed
"remediation was not a military function and that such a program, if carried out,
should be done under the aegis of a civilian agency such as the Office of Economic
Opportunity."56 Legislators also felt that an attempt by the military to take on such
a role while managing a buildup in manpower for the VietNam conflict would place
too great a burden on training facilities. To ensure that the Administration could not
tack on a rider or an amendment to the bill in order to get the program passed,
Congress attached a proviso to the DOD appropriation for FY 1966, forbidding the
use of any moneys to pay for STEP or similar programs. The program was never
implemented.57
Undaunted by Congressional disapproval, McNamara tried again in August
1966. As pro- and anti-war demonstrators marched outside, McNamara told a
meeting of the Veterans of Foreign Wars58 that he planned to
"...uplift the "subterranean poor" by taking into the military each year 100,000
young men who would normally be rejected." He said, "Poverty is a social and
political paralysis that atrophies ambition and drains away hope. It saps the
strength of nations. . because it withers and weakens the human potential
necessary to development." 59
McNamara announced that approximately 100,000 of those who failed the AFQT
could be accepted and, through "the application of advanced educational and
medical techniques," be "salvaged," first for "productive military careers and later
55 The STEP program proposed a period of "pre-basic" training for "those with skill or physical deficits;
the assistance provided during this phase would then supposedly allow them to function successfully in the
military." Only voluntary enlistees scoring between the 15 th and 3 0 th percentiles on the AFQT (i.e. those
in the Category IV range), and those with medical defects that could be corrected within six weeks, would be
eligible STEP candidates. For intellectually "marginal" recruits, "pre-basic" remedial training would
emphasize verbal, arithmetic, and mechanical skills. STEP was to be conducted at an estimated cost of
$31.5 million per year, approximately $1 million of which was for trainee compensation. At an annual
rate of 15,000 candidates over a four year period, the estimated price tag per trainee would have been $2,100.
[Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 16.]
56 ibid.
57 ibid.
58 Shapley, p. 384. Shapley argues that the Veterans of Foreign Wars was "the most hostile possible
audience" for such a proposal.
59 ibid. See also McNamara, R. S., The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1968, p. 128.
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for productive roles in society." These recruits could ultimately then return to
civilian life "with skills and aptitudes, which for them and their families would
reverse the downward spiral of human decay." 60
The plan for "Project 100,000" was structured so as to circumvent the need
for Congressional approval. McNamara's Project 100,000 recruits, also known as
"New Standards Men" [NSM], began entering the service in October 1966, and by
1968, 148,000 men had been brought in.61 The enlistment was completed despite
strong resistance within the military and the reticence of some of McNamara's top
manpower experts.62
Project 100,000 was adversarial in nature, designed, in short, to
demonstrate the military's resistance ill-founded. McNamara decided that the best
way to illustrate that low-aptitude men could be "fully satisfactory soldiers" was by
keeping their commanders ignorant of who they were. Project 100,000 was
supposed to be a blind experiment run on a mammoth military organization. Draft
boards and recruiting centers were instructed to guarantee that 22.3 percent of all
recruits inducted were Category IVs (i.e., those who would be otherwise have been
rejected due to aptitude deficits).6 3 The boards and centers were then instructed to
identify, within the Category IVs, a subset of men with specific characteristics that
marked them as victims of poverty. These men were to be identified as part of the
experiment only by a secret code in their file.64 Of those accepted under the new
60 Shapley, p. 385. See also Moynihan, D. P., "One Third of a Nation," The New Republic,
9 June 1982.
61 Equal numbers of draftees and volunteers were taken. Over 40 percent of the those taken were non-
whites and more than 50 percent had not finished high school. [From Moskos, C., The American Enlisted
Man, pp. 171-2.]
62 For example, Alfred Fitt, one of McNamara's closest advisors, suggested that McNamara start with a
small 3,000 man pilot program; on a small scale, he argued, the program would have had a greater
likelihood of success, and subsequent conversion of a skeptical Congress.; Shapley, p. 385.
63 During this period, Category IV's were those men who scored between the 10th and 30th percentiles on
the AFQT. The average Project 100,000 recruit was 20.3 years old, and scored at the 13.5 percentile--quite
low compared with the average regular recruit, who scored at the 56.8 percentile. [From Forging a Military
Youth Corps, p. 28.]
64 The supposed secret character of the experiment did not remain so for long. From the beginning, many
trainers and commanders were convinced they could identify NSM, even without knowledge of their AFQT
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guidelines, 41.2% were African-American and only 45.2 percent had high school
diplomas. 65
Unfortunately or fortunately (depending upon one's perspective), though
standards were lowered for acceptance based on the AFQT qualifying examination,
these same hurdles were not lowered for entry into the military's technical schools.
After basic training, only the most technically qualified were recommended for
advanced training. The rest were "shunted off into occupations the Pentagon
euphemistically calls 'soft-skill' areas: supply and food service, clerical, and, most
importantly, the infantry."6 6
From the military's point of view, of course, this was the best possible
outcome. But for many of those the program was designed to help, the education
and technical training, envisioned by McNamara, would not be forthcoming.
Instead, the bulk of NSM became instead combat arms specialists, which led
inevitably to charges that the burden of fighting the VietNam War was
disproportionately carried by these men. In Project 100,000's first three years,
nearly half of the Army's share of NSM, and well over 50 percent of the Marine
Corps' share, were given combat-related assignments. By 1968, fully 70 percent
of the Marine Corps' NSM were assigned to combat specialties. The results were
what one might expect from such a distribution; for instance, a Category IVB
recruit who entered the Marine Corps in 1968 was two-and-a-half times more likely
to die in combat than his Category I and II counterparts. 67
Critics point to this fact as both an indication of discrimination within the
military towards NSM and a failure of the program, in general. However, it is
important to keep in mind that there was a war underway, and the need for trained
scores or backgrounds. Later, some military personnel actually cracked the code, and this method of
identification was abandoned.
65 Forging a Military Youth Corps, p. 28
66 Evans, D., Losing Battle: The army and the underclass, The New Republic, 30 June 1986, p. 12.
67 ibid., pp. 12-3.
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personnel--particularly in the infantry--was quite real. The fact that a greater
proportion of the "intellectually marginal" soldiers were assigned to infantry
occupations may simply reflect the lower training requirements for these jobs, as
well as the relative lack of skills and abilities the NSM brought upon entering the
service.
Even so, such a rationalization may be just as damning evidence against the
program. For instance, as retired Marine lieutenant colonel Bill Corson asserts, "It
might not have been a disaster if there had not been a war.. .They should have
been treated as sole surviving sons," he says, thereby excusing them from combat.
They weren't. Because they were not, critics of Project 100,000 maintain the
program was never intended to provide a "socially uplifting experience" through
vocational training. According to Corson, "They were cannon fodder, pure and
simple." Whether one subscribes to Corson's conspiracy theory or not, it is clear
that "Project 100,000 resulted in an infusion of manpower that helped forestall the
mobilization of the National Guard and reserve, which provided a haven for draft-
age men, the majority of them whites." 68
Despite initial claims of verifiable success, 69 whether Project 100,000
ultimately provided an escape from ignorance and unemployment for the 300,000-
plus men known alternately as "McNamara's Millions" and "McNamara's Morons"
remains unclear, but appears dubious. Critics charge that while some New
Standards Men succeeded in the services; untold others suffered emotionally and
physically. "Many [NSM] weren't even on a fifth-grade level," says Herb de
Bose, a former first lieutenant who works with veterans. "The Army was
68 Evans, p. 13.
69 [See Little, R. and Janowitz, M., "Basic Education and Youth Socialization in the Armed Forces," and
Moskos, C., The American Enlisted Man, Chapter 8.] To this day, McNamara still claims the program
was a success, and says he would do it over again, given the chance. [See Shapley, Promise and Power.]
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supposed to teach them a trade, but they had "no skills before, no skills after," says
de Bose. "I think McNamara should be shot." 70
The Effect of Project 100,000 on the U.S. Military
Like the CCC before it, a major obstacle to answering the question of
whether the military benefited from this "infusion of manpower" is determining
what criteria should be used. A good place to start, however, is by analyzing how
well the NSM actually did while in service. A central contention of Project
100,000's architects was that those chosen would be able to function effectively
(and anonymously) in a military environment and make valuable contributions
toward successful missions.71 As has been noted above, the validity of this claim
is dubious. Project 100,000 recruits suffered higher casualty rates than their
Category I and II compatriots. But whether this was due to the fact that they
performed more poorly as soldiers on the battlefield, or simply because they were
so much more likely to be assigned to combat specialties than their more technically
adept counterparts, is ambiguous. However, it seems likely that the disparity in
casualty ratios stems more from the fact that NMS were so much more likely to be
on the battlefield than because of any battlefield skill differences. 72
Examination of attrition rates and training data for the NSM provides a more
revealing illustration of the performance of NSM. During the first three-plus years
of Project 100,000, attrition rates for NSM were one and one-half to three times
higher than they were for regular personnel. 7 3 Achievement disparities between
NSM and regular recruits appeared elsewhere as well. For instance, one of the
70 Shapley, p. 387.
71 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 43.
72 As Professor Harvey Sapolsky points out, if the NSM were performing in a markedly inferior manner
[compared with their counterparts], someone would have noticed, and they would have been removed from
front-line duty. For by letting an obviously incompetent soldier on the battlefield, the life of every other
soldier present would be endangered. Hence, those posing a risk would likely have been dismissed.
73 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 44.
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principal tenets of Project 100,000 was that participants would be held to the same
performance standards as their "regular" peers. Hence, the only recourse available
to [the anonymous] NSM experiencing difficulties was to be recycled [i.e., put
back into the manpower pool and assigned to another job], or to receive remedial
training. A recent study on the performance of NSM showed their recycling rates
to be anywhere from 1.35 (Army) to 1 1.12 (Navy) times higher than corresponding
rates for regular recruits. The percentage of NSM who required remedial training
was, likewise, much higher: 8.75 percent of Army NSM, 15.8 percent of Air
Force NSM, and 22.4 percent of Navy NSM needed remedial help, while only
about one percent of Army and Navy, and slightly more than three percent of Air
Force, control group personnel required such training.7 4
Another useful tool for evaluating the Project's success are performance
records in skill training. Recruits norma;lly receive instruction in a specific job,
usually immediately after completing basic training. When skill course dropout
rates for NSM are compared with those of regular personnel, attrition rates mirror
those observed in the basic training data. The percentage of Project 100,000 men
who dropped out due to academic, medical, and/or administrative reasons was two
to three times higher that of others who attended the same courses. 7 5
Perhaps the harshest criticism that can be aimed at Project 100,000, with
respect to its effect on the military, is that "it disrupted military order by introducing
a large number of people with backgrounds that were disabling in terms of their
ability to adapt."76 As noted in one study of Project 100,000,
the means by which the military functions is based in no small way on the
control it exercises over its members, and the influence it can bring to bear in
developing a well-disciplined cadre of Service members. In such an
74 See Ramsberger, P. and Means, B., Military Performance for Low-Aptitude Recruits: A Reexamination
of Data from Project 100,000 and the ASVAB Misnorming Period, FR-PRD-87-3 1, Alexandria, VA:
Human Resources Research Organization [HumRRO1, 1987.
75 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 46. See also Stichl,Thomas Cast-Off Youth: Policy and Training
Methods from the Military Experience, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987.
76 ibid., p. 47
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environment, large numbers of individuals who resist or are unable to conform
in such an environment threaten the order that must exist if everyone is going to
work effectively towards a single mission. 7 7
One method by which to measure the salience of this claim is to look at the number
of NSM men who committed punishable offenses during their time in the armed
forces. Review of this data indicates that, in fact, NSM were guilty of between 2.7
and 7.8 percent more infractions than regular military personnel. 78
Review of the factors above supports the assertion that the military was
fully justified in its reluctance to assimilate low-aptitude recruits. While many of
"those men [ ] excluded from the military on the basis of their AFQT scores
include[d] a number of men who performledl well," overall, the military would
have been better served by relying solely on higher quality recruits. As
demonstrated above, NSM attrited with greater frequency, required more remedial
training, and were guilty of more punishable infractions than regular personnel. In
addition, according to a separate study conducted by researchers at the Human
Resources Research Organization IHumRROI, "depending on the particular task,
low-aptitude subjects required from two to four times as much training time, from
two to five times as many trials to reach criterion, and from two to six times as
much prompting as did high aptitude subjects."7 9 This is scarcely surprising when
one considers that fully 63 percent of NSM only scored in the 10-15 percentile on
the AFQT test.8 0 In short, McNamara's New Standards Men were not a
worthwhile addition to the U.S. military, from either a skills or a manpower
perspective.
77 ibid.
78 ibid., p. 49. (see also Appendix I)
79 ibid., p. 53. [See also Wayne L. Fox, John E. Taylor, and John S. Caylor, Aptitude Level and the
Acquisition of Skills and Knowledges in a Variety of Military Training Tasks, HumRRO Technical Report
69-6 (Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, May 1969).]
80 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 36.
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Project 100,000 and its Participants
Even in the face of the contrary evidence illustrated above, die-hard
advocates continue to proclaim Project 100,000 a success, maintaining that the
program's effect on the military is more or less irrelevant. Project 100,000 was not
conceived to aid the military; it was created to help the underprivileged. The real
issue that bears addressing, they argue, is whether Project 100,000 accomplished
its social mission. The impetus behind McNamara's program was not a desire to
turn the disadvantaged into the affluent, but rather to ameliorate and conquer their
skills deficits. Thus if he were successful, it should be reflected in higher rates of
employment, earnings, and education for the NSM veterans over their low-aptitude
non-veteran peers. Examination of data comparing NSM and low-aptitude non-
veterans reveals, however, that veterans have not fared significantly better than their
civilian counterparts, and in many aspects, are actually worse off.81
A comparative survey conducted in 1981 found that approximately 88
percent of former NSM were employed full or part-time, while 91 percent of low-
aptitude non-veterans were employed. When adjusted for age [i.e., only
respondents between the ages of 35-40], this employment differential increases--
89.7 percent of NSM veterans were gainfully employed as opposed to 97.2 percent
of non-veterans. Moreover, when those surveyed were asked to indicate the type
of establishment for which they worked, a higher proportion of low-aptitude non-
veteran respondents were employed privately (76 percent versus 68 percent), or
owned their own business (15 percent versus 10 percent) than Project 100,000
respondents. Also, a significantly greater proportion of Project 100,000 veterans
were employed by the government (23 percent versus 9 percent) than their civilian
peers.82
81 ibid., p. 111.
82 ibid., p. 112. The fact that 14 percent more veterans than nonveterans are employed by the government
may reflect hiring preferences of the 1960s and 1970s.
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With respect to income and other economic indicators, low-aptitude non-
veterans reported a mean hourly wage approximately four dollars higher than their
Project 100,000 counterparts. If adjusted for age, this differential actually increases
to five dollars per hour. "Thus, low-aptitude civilians were making more in 1981
than low-aptitude veterans were making in 1985-6." 83 These results clearly
illustrate that any advantage derived from military service did not translate into
higher future incomes. These results show that NSM either did not receive the
"boost" that McNamara hoped military service would provide, or were unable to
translate this advantage into a competitive edge in the civilian world.84
Another benefit hypothesized to accrue to low-aptitude individuals from
military participation was a sense of discipline, maturity, and goal orientation that
would prove advantageous upon their return to civilian life. [This criteria is of
crucial significance with regard to current proposals, which tout the ability of the
military to instill these qualities as a major selling point.I One indirect measure of
this claim's validity is the level of education and training obtained by Project
100,000 participants upon their return to civilian life. Contrary to expectations,
low-aptitude non-veterans achieved a higher average level of formal schooling--
12.3 years as opposed to 11.7 years for the veterans. Since the average reported
grade completed at time of enrollment for a Project 100,000 participant was 10.7
grade levels, evidently many of them did supplement their education. On the other
hand, 27.3 percent of NSM never finished high school, and at the time of the
survey, only three percent had graduated from college. 85 Thus, in every category
examined, Project 100,000 veterans were either no better off, or were actually
worse off than their non-veteran peers.
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83 ibid., p. 115.
84 ibid., pp. 115-8; p. 118.
85 ibid,, p. 119.
Nonetheless, program advocates steadfastly maintain, "the military offered
not just a chance for employment, above poverty income, health and housing care,
and training and education, but also (for somel a career....[So] whether [the
program has been] helpful or not to an individual is probably best determined...
by asking them."86 Researchers did precisely that. Surveys were administered in
which NSM were asked to reflect on the effects of military service on their careers
and their lives.87 Nearly half of the Project 100,000 veterans felt that their military
experience had had a positive effect on their subsequent careers, while only 14
percent said the impact had been harmful. More than a third believed that the
experience had no effect at all. Of those who responded positively, "maturity"
(37.9 percent) was the reason most often given. The next most oft cited reasons
were "other" and "training,"(25.5 and 16.5 percent, respectively). [see Appendix
III for details.]
Thus, despite objective evidence to the contrary, a majority of low-aptitude
veterans felt they actually benefited from their time in the service. One must
question, however, the rationale of viewing a reluctant military as our most
effective method of building self-esteem and transforming low-aptitude "boys into
men." While much can be said in defense of building character and self-esteem, the
finding that as a group Project 100,000 men trailed indexes of life achievement runs
counter to the expressed logic and expectations of such programs. If Project
100,000 was the success its advocates purport it to be, why weren't most, if not all
of these men better off economically, educationally, and socially after their service?
86 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 142. [See, also Thomas Sticht, Cast-off Youth: Policy and Training
Methods from the Military Experience.]
87 Surveys were given to samples of Project 100,000 participants from October 1986 through December
1987. Those surveyed were asked, first, whether they felt that being in the military had "helped," "hurt,"
or "had no effect" on their careers, and second, if the respondent stated that the experience had either helped
or hurt, he was then asked to specify the way in which it had done so. [See the Laurence and Ramsberger
study for more details.]
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A number of explanations for this phenomena have gained currency in
recent years. Perhaps "low-aptitude" men are inherently difficult to help, especially
by the time they have reached age 18. "By that time, adverse environmental
conditions and lack of opportunities may leave an indelible imprint of helplessness
of such individuals." 88 (If this assertion is, true, current programs like Project
ChalleNGe are doomed to fail.) Also, it is often asserted (though as often
contested) that military job training and experience does not easily transfer to the
civilian world.89 Even those trained for jobs with civilian equivalents may
experience problems locating the right civilian position, understanding the
commonalties, and communicating them to a prospective employer. Furthermore,
readjustment to the world outside of the military is often problematic, and probably
more so for so-called "marginal" individuals. In addition to the barriers of military-
specific training and "soft-skill" assignments that may not have been particularly
career enhancing, some individuals find it extremely difficult to function outside of
the rigid, hierarchical, and paternal structure to which they have become
accustomed. Outside of the protective military milieu, low-aptitude veterans have
been compelled to fend for themselves in a less predictable and egalitarian
environment. In short, the security offered by the military vanished with the
uniform.90
88 ibid.
89 See Magnum, S. L., and Ball, D. E., "Military Skill Training: Some Evidence of Transferability,"
Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 13, No. 3, Spring 1987, pp. 425-441. Magnum and Ball contend that a
fair degree of transferability does exist. For instance, 47.2% of all military occupational specialties were
transferable, using their criteria. "With other factors controlled, males were most readily able to transfer
training in the service, craft, and equipment repair occupations (e.g. for males, craftsmen ranked highest-
61.1%, while combat arms ranked lowest-28.6%). [Alsol, analysis of skill transfer between nonmilitary
training providers and employment showed that the occupational areas offering the greatest probability of
skill transfer were similar to those that emerged in the analysis of military training." (p. 438) However,
even if Magnum and Ball's results hold true, lack of transferability may still be considered an important
factor since, as was noted above, the majority of Project 100,000 recruits ended up in combat arms
specialties.
90 Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 145.
35
The assertion that acclimation to civilian society may be a serious banier is
often rejoined with the contention that, perhaps, Project 100,000 participants would
have been better off remaining in the military. However, such an assertion carries
with it a perverse logic. Though low-aptitude personnel may have been aptly suited
to low-complexity entry-level jobs, the military with its emphasis on youth and
malleability in the lower echelons could hardly afford to leave them there. The
military has a primary mission that cannot accommodate a jobs program for the
semi-skilled. Countenancing such a strategy could prove dangerous to our national
security both on a macre- and a microcosmic level.
Thus, it is hardly surprisingly that the military's unwillingness to accept
these men (let alone retain them) remained steadfast throughout the life of the
program. In short, despite the individual successes of Project 100,000, one can
hardly deem it the grand success McNamara hoped it would be. This rather
expensive social experiment prove to be a cumbersome and morale draining]
distraction for the military, and of little ultimate worth to the underprivileged men it
was created to help. As one former Army draftee noted, "We tried to fight a war on
two fronts in the sixties-a war in VietNam and a war on poverty--and we lost
both." 9 1
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91 ibid., p. 139.
III. History Repeats Itself: The Case for Contemporary Programs
Project ChalleNGe: A Modem Youth Corps
In spite of the dubious record of past programs, youth development
proposals infused with a substantial military component are continue to be
reintroduced. Three decades after the advent of Project 100,000, yet another
program has been launched that relies on the U.S. military to aid the
underprivileged. Project ChalleNGe, as the program is known, is centered around
a plan to rescue "at risk" youth by sending them to military-youth camps, similar in
structure to the CCC camps, but with a the target group more closely resembling
that of Project 100,000.
Steadfastly refusing to view past attempts as questionable successes (or
downright failures), advocates of this approach believe that participation in a youth-
military corps will provide underprivileged youth with the vocational training,
formal educational opportunities, financial benefits, and personal skills normally
associated with military service. These anticipated benefits will supposedly equip
participants with the aptitude needed to adopt and maintain more rewarding
lifestyles. According to the program's promoters, "these qualities of military life--
job skills training, financial and educational opportunities, self-discipline, goal-
setting, and esprit de corps--are those believed to be of potential benefit to today's
youth population who are at risk of dropping out not just from school but from all
of society." 92
The genesis of Project ChalleNGe began in 1989 when Hugh Price, vice-
president of the Rockefeller Foundation, began to explore the possibility of
reintroducing the role of the military as welfare provider. When Price approached
the military, neither the Army, the Navy, the Air Force nor the Marines were
9 2 Forging a Military Youth Corps: A Military-Youth Service Partnership for High School Dropouts,
(The Final Report of the CSIS National Community Service for Out-of-School Youth Project),
Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1992, p. viii.
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interested. However, for reasons of altruism and/or self-preservation in this period
of drastic military budget cuts, the National Guard expressed interest in accepting
this mission. The Guard argued that their close community associations made them
well-suited to such a program. Objectively speaking, however, there was little
similarity between Price's proposal and past Guard missions (e.g., rapid response
to riots and natural disasters), so exactly why the Guard felt uniquely qualified to
run a military-youth corps is unclear. Dan Donahue of the National Guard Bureau
asserts, "this program is the military's way of adding value to America." 93 This
view was echoed by Project Director, Captain Bill Morris, "As a tax-paying citizen,
it makes me feel good to be doing something for ourselves." 9 4
This proposed marriage of the National Guard and a youth-military corps
then became the subject of a study initiated by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies [CSIS]. "The CSIS project was initiated to place the idea in
people's minds that it [a military-youth corps] should even exist."9 5 The result of
the study was a design for a military-sponsored residential training camp. Project
ChalleNGe, 96 has a target group of recent high school dropouts, between the ages
of 16 and 18. "This group was chosen because," according to project director
Morris, "statistics show that within six to nine months after leaving school, 90
percent of all young people are in trouble with the law, drugs, and/or alcohol.97 If
we can reach some of them before this happens, we will have been a success."9 8
93 Quote conveyed on three separate occasions in May 1993 telephone interviews with Wade Gatling
(PPV), Liz Ondaatje (RAND), and Jennifer Eaves (CSIS).
94 Telephone interview with Captain Morris, May 1993.
95 Telephone interview with Jennifer Eaves, "Project Challenge" Project Director, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, May 1993.
96 The capital N and G stand for National Guard.
97 Author's note: Though it is universally agreed that dropouts are definitely an "at-risk" groupl, this
number [i.e., 90 percent] seems extraordinarily high. After consulting other sources, this researcher
believes the real number probably lies between 50 and 65 percent.
9 8 Telephone interview with Captain Bill Morris, Public Affairs Office, National Guard Bureau in May
1993.
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The CSIS study was conducted and led by a steering panel composed of
Representative Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma, Senator John McCain of Arizona, and
a number of working groups made up of representatives from the military, youth
service fields, and academia.99 The committee concluded that the youth corps idea
was feasible in the short term, with long-term feasibility contingent upon the
findings of an appropriate pilot program evaluation team. 1°° "Although the
proposed program was not what "many [members] view as the right idea for
national service," according to Representative McCurdy's legislative assistant Alden
Schacher, in the end the entire steering committee stood behind the report's
recommendations. 0 Project Director Jennifer Eaves concurs, "Project ChalleNGe
was very much a Guard driven idea, one not shared by many [if not a majority] of
steering committee members. But nobody says no to the National Guard." 10 2
Unfortunately, Eaves may be correct. Even before the CSIS study was
completed, the National Guard submitted a request for $1.6 million to start a pilot
program. In response, for FY 1992 Congress appropriated $2 million for the
establishment of two six-month residential programs to be designed and operated
by the National Guard. These programs were originally slated to commence in
early 1992, but due to Bush Administration resistance, no further action was taken,
and none of the appropriated funds were released.
In the meantime, CSIS published their report (in September 1992) entitled
Forging a Military-Youth Corps: A Military-Youth Service Partnership for High
School Dropouts. Publication of the document, and the subsequent Clinton
victory, gave new life to the National Guard proposal. Advocates, such as Senator
99 Forging a Military-Youth Corps, p. vii.; McCurdy and McCain have been active in trying to create a
national service since the late 1980s.
100 ibid., p. xii.
101 Telephone interview conducted with Alden Schacher, of Representative McCurdy's office, in May 1993.
The use of "everybody" in the quote is meant to encompass all youth, not just at-risk youth.
102 Telephone interview with Jennifer Eaves, Project ChalleNGe Project Director, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, May 1993.
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Sam Nunn of Georgia, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, spoke out in
favor of the Guard plan,
While performing regular missions, their (role models from the
military) innovative and flexible involvement in outreach and mentoring
programs can send a powerful message to our youth-that discipline, commitment
and hard work matter.. .In the long run, the most important line of defense for
our national and economic security will not be a line in the middle of Europe or
in the sand of the Middle East, but the line of students going to college and
graduate school to earn degrees in math and science.
The National Guard is developing a program that will target high-risk
youth who do not have strong role models or solid educational backgrounds and
whose lives have been affected by drug abuse .. .There are many opportunities
for military units to provide assistance to local communities while training for
their military missions.10 3
Of course, not everyone is equally enamored of this idea. As one detractor
explains,
Unfortunately, advocates of Government activism have discovered the
military. If the services were able to reduce purts of Baghdad to rubble, the
argument runs, they should be able to rebuild Los Angeles, feed the hungry and
meet various social needs. If a major earthquake hit California, declares
Representative Pete Stark, "We need someone like Stormin' Norman on the
job."
... Moreovcr, once members of Congress perceive that they can look
good by getting the military involved in social tasks in their districts, we will
see troop deployments as well as procurement contracts determined by pork
barrel politics. 104
Fears of the intrusion of pork barrel politics may be well-founded as political
ambitions may have already obtained a tight grasp on the program. By the time the
proposal made it through Congress, the funds appropriated to Project ChalleNGe
were no longer a paltry $2 million, but a rather exceptional sum of $44 million, to
be divided among ten pilot programs. 105 The states eligible for funding are as
follows: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
New York, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. When queried about the criteria
employed in determining recipient states, Captain Morris, director of the program,
103 Nunn, S., "Use the military to help solve America's ills," Atlanta Constituion, 28 December 1992,
p. 13.
104 Bandow, D., "Soldiers, Not Kiwanians," The New York Times, (Op-Ed), Vol. CXLII, No. 49,325, 8
May 1993, p. 21.
105 Information received during a May 1993 telephone interview with Captain Bill Morris, U.S. Army
National Guard, Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau.
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replied, "They [were] chosen in a number of ways. I don't want to say, strictly...
well, first, we look[ed] at dropout rates state-wide compared to the national
average. But, that does not always hold. For example, Connecticut does not have
a high dropout level state-wide, but they have some troublesome urban areas."10 6
In reality, of the ten states chosen, only two have dropout rates that rank
among the top ten problem states nationwide, and only five states have dropout
rates that are even within the top 20 highest, nationwide.' 0 7 [See Appendix IV for
details.] Instead, the ten pilot programs are sited in the home states of both
Congressional members of the C.S.I.S. steering committee, the President, and
several very powerful members of Congress. Certainly the placement of pilot
programs is merely circumstantial evidence of political patronage. On the other
hand, pilot programs are generally meant to be tests of an as yet unproved idea. As
these pilot sites now encompass nearly a third of the fifty states, 10 8 the term "pilot
program" has clearly become a misnomer. Such widespread implementation was
surely not needed to test the program concept (cf., the more limited Guard proposal
for FY 92).
Furthermore, each of the original pilot programs was to receive just over $1
million. Now, though the money will not be divided equally, the average has
reached $4.4 million per camp.l0 9 The most interesting, and perhaps most
troubling aspect of this Congressional largess, is that this increased appropriation
was granted without request on the part of the National Guard. "They [the Guard]
have had a phenomenal success rate. They put in for $1.6 million, and out comes
106 Telephone interview with Captain Morris, May 1993. In filct, Connecticul's rate is among the lowest
dropout rates nationwide. [see Appendix IV].
107 Taken from the 1991 Decennial Census and the Digest of Education Statistics 1992; SOURCE: U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Educational Attainment of Workers, March 1990,
unpublished data.
10 This includes the ten sites funded for the first cycle plus four additional sites now under consideration.
1 09These prodigious appropriations have led researchers at the CSIS to query, "Are they planning to supply
these kids with night-vision goggles?"
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$44 million. Who else can say that these days?"1"0 "To put it undelicately(sic),
[Project ChalleNGe] is a way for the National Guard to create a role for itself in the
21st century," said Beth Solomon, an aide to Senator Nunn. "It is a post-cold-war
response"--a response that, at least in appearances, seems to be driven more by
pork barrel politics than by a desire to help the most "at-risk" underprivileged youth
[i.e, since only 20% of the pilot programs are sited in states with the highest
dropout rates.] 1 1
Such an outcome, while rarely disturbing, should come as no surprise.
Historically, the National Guard has received extensive support from Congress for
a very simple reason: a Congressmaln's Guardsnlen are also his constituents. In the
present case, both Guardmen and their communities stand to directly benefit from
the acquisition of a Project ChalleNGe camp. Hosting a camp brings new jobs,
increases commerce to existing businesses, and in some cases, may even forestall
the post-Cold War closure of bases or amlories. 112 While there is much to be said
for the utilization of surplus military facilities, if Project ChalleNGe exists
principally as an excuse to provide Guardsmen and their communities with moneys
to ameliorate the effects of the drawdown, better wavs can be found to distribute
such funds and similarly, better methods can surely be found to tackle the problems
of "at-risk" youth.
Ignoring for the moment, the political patronage, real or perceived, that is
associated with the youth corps, advocates can still make a case for backing the
National Guard's bid for this new mission. After all, $44 million is a relatively
110 Telephone interview with Jennifer Eaves, May 1993.
111 Winerap, M., "Military Regimen for Teen-Age Dropouts," New York Times, 11 August 1993,
p. 1A.
112 For instance, at Williams Air Force Base in Arizona, which was slated to close in 1993, hosting a
Project ChalleNGe camp has brought new life to the base, "Plans include a commercial airport, university
classes and various companies eager to open their doors to new markets." Getting the base ready for
ChalleNGe cadets has also provided business for the local construction industry, and "workers were rushing
to renovate several buildings for the program." [see Padgett, "Air Base Heads into Last Month in the
Military," The Arizona RepubliclPhoenix Gazette, 3 September 1993, p. 1.]
42
small sum of money, and a large portion of camp expenses will actually be borne
by host states and communities. Besides, although arguably not the most efficient
means to help at risk youth,"l 3 it is still supposedly an expeditious means to that
end. So the real question then becomes, is Project ChalleNGe somehow innately
different from its predecessors? Will it succeed where others have failed?
Implementation and Evaluation of the Program
On August 6, 1993, the first pilot program officially opened in Niantic,
Connecticut. The program "relie[d] heavily on current and former military
personnel to tutor, counsel, and discipline the dropouts in preparation for their
taking the General Equivalency Diploma, or G.E.D. After completing the five
montn session, [enrollees were tol be assigned a Guard member from their
community who [will] serve as mentor for a year." l 14 Fifty-five percent of the
original group were black or Hispanic, 20 percent were female, and 44 percent
came from the state's largest cities, Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport. In
terms of raw numbers, the Connecticut group composed a representative cross-
section of the target group the program was designed to help. 15
Lessons gleaned from the military's past forays into the realm of social
work [e.g., the CCC and Project 100,0001 offer scant hope that real and tangible
benefits will accrue to either the military or the program's participants. Estimations
of the Guard's ability to fulfill its official project goals run the gamut from
"attainable," to "rather lofty," and are tempered with a "wait and see" attitude. l l6
Youth experts do agree, however, that residential interventions like Project
113 This lack of efficiency argument has dominated the list of criticisms levelled at the Guard by other
services, according to Gatling.
114 Winerap, p. 1A con'd.
115 Although the racial make-up of cadets has varied across states, gender and background characteristics
have been similiar in all states.
116 These opinions have been expressed by Lt. Greg Isbill (OKLA National Guard), Jennifer Eaves (CSIS),
and Wade Gatling (PPV), respectively, in telephone interviews, May 1993.
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ChalleNGe are the most effective way of reaching troubled youth. "You have their
attention 24 hours a day. One cannot help but make some sort of impact. What is
harder to do is sustain the impact after these kids are back on the street. In our
experience, you really need a series of interventions with these youth. There needs
to be some continuity in their lives." 117
The original Project ChalleNGe model recommended a residential phase of
one year, with another year of community mentorship loverseen by the Guard] to
follow. Due to budget constraints, the residential portion of the program was
shortened to six months, only to be later cut down to a 22 week period. Youth
specialists wonder, with good reason, how much can be accomplished in such a
short time. Because the residential period has been cut in half, the year of post-
residential mentorship becomes crucially important. Unfortunately for participants,
however, there is little reason to think that because Guardsmen have been
successful at dealing with natural disasters, they will necessarily be gifted mentors
and counselors.
Moreover, it is doubtful that one year of counseling will have a profound
effect on these teens, many of whom have already spent as least that long in penal
institutions. 1l 8 In its statement of project goals, the Guard stated that it expected
100% of its participants to enroll in either a high school diploma or G.E.D.
program, and a 100% placement rate of its graduates. [see Appendix V for
statement of project goals and missions. These official goals seemed especially
optimistic given the make-up of the Connecticut group. "The average reading level
[was] sixth grade, 74 percent [had notl completeld] their junior year of high school
and nearly one-third [had] been expelled from school." 19 Though lofty goals may
117 Telephone interview with Wade Gatling, May 1993.
118 For example, several of the Connecticut programs enrolleecs were lbrmer drug dealers, while others had




be inspiring and make for good press copy, they may be fatal to the program if they
prove impossible to reach.
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the National Guard program
will prove more effective at rehabilitating "at-risk" youth than, for example, the
Department of Health and Human Services, an organization designed for and
devoted to achieving these and similar goals. Besides, it is absurd that the military
should be responsible for overseeing what is, in essence, a glorified high school
G.E.D. program, at an average cost of $18,000 per student, when local school
districts can do the same for approximately $5,0(X) per student. Program expenses
seem especially prodigious when one considers that spending on regular public
school pupils is less than $6,000 per year, and does not provide its students with
the incentives and perquisites afforded these dropouts. 120 "The dropouts are
outfitted from head (red baseball caps) to toe (ADIDAS sneakers), get a $15 weekly
allowance, books, and briefcases"--plus, of course, room and board for five
months.121 In addition, upon successful completion of the program and the
G.E.D. test, each enrollee receives a S2,200 stipend. Those who are too young to
take the test need simply to return to school in order to receive the money.
One could, moreover, speculate about the effects of the rather perverse
incentive structure such remuneration creates. The average student who stays in
school receives no "extra" pecuniary benefits, and is the passive recipient of less
than $6,000 per year in funding. Meanwhile, ChalleNGe dropouts are given
clothing, food, lodging, a weekly stipend, and a $2,200 bonus. The logic behind
such an incentive structure defies explanation.
On the face of it, given these extraordinary perquisites, [and the Guard's
claims about the merits of its program], one would expect most, presumably




earnest, participants to take full advantage of this unique opportunity. However, of
the 172 volunteers accepted into the Connecticut program, nearly 30 percent left the
ChalleNGe camp before it even officially opened. During the two week
orientation, many found they could not handle the paramilitary atmosphere and
withdrew [a predictable outcome, given attrition rate data for past programs.] Over
a dozen more were expelled, and four volunteers were arrested on charges of
assaulting a fellow enrollee. Hardly an encouraging record for a camp that had not
yet even opened its doors, and as we shall see below, a telling portent of things to
come.12 2
The Expected Impact of ChalleNGe land its clones 0on the Military
In the face of such an inauspicious beginning, the National Guard was
undaunted. Guard officials remained optimistic about the program chances for
success, and with good reason, in light of the potential employment opportunities
offered by Project ChalleNGe. If the pilot camps provide any indication of what
lies ahead, the National Guard ought to be very optimistic, indeed. "Financing is
generous--more typical of a military than a social welfare program." 12 3 "Anybody
-wvh is anybody wanted th[ese] joblsl," according to platoon leader David
Henderson, hardly surprising given that salaries for camp educators are over
$30,000 per year, while the average starting salary for a teacher in the United States
is just over $19,000 per year. 124
Yet, for all of the perquisites offered to the military in this period of budget
cutbacks, none of the other branches of the military are clamoring to participate in
122 A similar situation occured when the first camp in Arizona opened in October 1993. The initial
enrollment of 108 students fell by 16 percent due to "reasons ranging from disputes with instructors to
complaints about the rigid schedule" before the program began. By the end of the five month program,
30 percent had dropped out or been dismissed. [see the Phoenix Gazette, 7 October 1993, p. BI.]
123 Winerap, p. 1A.
124 ibid. and Letter to the Editor, "Don't Rob Schools to Pay for Boot Camps," New York Times, 18
August 1993. p, 18A.
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the ChalleNGe program, nor have they proposed similar programs themselves.
The fact is, the vast majority of active duty personnel do not support the idea.
Reasons for this opposition varies. As the Rand report, Policy Options for Army
Involvement in Youth Development, points out, "national level partnership"
programs like Project ChalleNGe "raise concerns. .. about detracting from primary
Army missions in that they may divert [or be perceived to divert] Army resources
and personnel away from an exclusive focus on core requirements." 12 5 In his
widely-read satirical account of the [future] downfall of the U.S. military, Colonel
C. J. Dunlap describes the dangers of using the military in the domestic social
sphere:
.. the U.S. military['s dutics...prolilfrated into a host of new missions, many
of which were far afield from traditional military duties. . .The American decision to
embrace non-traditional missions was a calamity for them. When the time came to meet
a traditional military threat.. .too many of their soldiers had lost their military skills and
their martial spirit. Indeed, they no longer were warriors, and had not been for years.
What is more, the new U.S. missions squandered what was left of their military budget at
the very time America needed every penny to keep its military a bona fide fighting
force. 12 6
While the scenario Dunlap writes about is fictitious, his description reflects the real
fears and beliefs held by most military personnel. Moreover, many of Dunlap's
observations do have a basis in fact. For, "indeed, of 18 missions given the
Department of Defense in 1992-1993, all but one were non-combat." 127
Other critics of Project ChalleVNGe are less hostile to the acceptance of non-
traditional missions in general, and many believe that some of the newly prescribed
missions are worthwhile. However, none of these critics believe rehabilitating "at-
risk" youth is one of these acceptable missions; such programs, they argue, ought
to handled by civilian agencies set up to deal with social welfare issues. As one
supporter of non-traditional missions puts it:
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125 Ondaatje, p. 60.
126 Dunlap, p. 66.
127 ibid.
Rather than continuing to resist these missions, the armed forces should embrace
them, albeit selectively. . Accordingly, national security policymakers need to map out
well-defined criteria for employing the military in non-combat roles,.. [and] should resist
calls by politicians and the press to employ its extremely attractive but extremely
expensive skills and resources to solve domestic and international woes better addressed by
civilian organizations. Using Army Special Forces personnel, for example, to teach in
crime-infested inner city schools, would be a waste of a orce designed and trained to carry
out missions in the world's most demanding and hostile environments. 1 2 8
Still other critics, rightfully, voice fears that ChalleNGe-like programs will
erode the military's sense of unique identity. They believe this mission is being
embraced simply to avoid the inevitability of the post-Cold War drawdown. For
instance, the fact that the National Guard has adopted this mission has elicited
explicit criticism from some active duty personnel, who view themselves [and their
services] as above such self-serving behaviors. As veteran Naval officer [and
CSIS Project Director for ChalleNGe , Jennifer Eaves notes,
those of us who have actually served in the military do not see this as a valid
part of our mission. Certain pragmatic implications certainly make it look like
a good idea. For instance, the military's awesome infrastructure and great
economies of scale. We are really good at doing this kind of thing. But, I really
do not think we should be doing it, especially if it is only being done to keep
from drawing down. And it is definitely not a good enough reason to keep
National Guard armories open.12 9
In short, most members of the military feel that Project ChalleNGe is
simply not the right job for its organiza;tion. It detracts from the military's primary
mission, wastes precious [and expensivel resources, degrades operational
readiness, and destroys the sense of mission and organizational culture that have
made the U.S. military such a potent fighting force heretofore. To a great extent,
the military has accepted, albeit reluctantly, the necessities of drawing down, and
most personnel believe we should now aim to keep the "remaining troops extremely
128 Rosenau, pp. 46-7.
129 Eaves has been in the Navy for more than a decade. She served as enlisted personnel for ten years,
received a commission, and now serves with the Navy Reserves. Telephone interview, May 1993. NOTE:
The reader may find it ironic to hear such criticism from the Project Director behind the CSIS report. This
is further evidence that many of those on the steering committee did not feel that Project ChalleNGe was
the right solution to this social problem.
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well trained and decidedly focused on the complex task of modem warfighting." 130
Such a strategy leaves little room for domestic distractions.
Expected Impact of Project ChalleNGe on its Participants
Seven months after the first camp was opened, the results of the first Project
ChalleNGe cycle have been released. Even for die-hard advocates, the results
cannot be encouraging. Though the National Guard reached 95% of their
enrollment target, the nation-wide retention rate as measured against the enrollment
target] was only 55%. In other words, of the 1322 cadets that were enrolled for the
first cycle [the original target was 1395 enrolleesl, only 774 participants
"graduated" from the 22 week program. Some states' programs fared markedly
better than others, but even rela:ively successful programs failed to meet Guard
expectations. For instance, though the Illinois program boasted a respectable 96%
retention rate, they attained only 64% of their enrollment target. The one anomaly
in an otherwise dismal showing, was the camp in Georgia, which had a [relatively
low] 19% attrition rate; and of the 81% of cadets that remained in the program, 97%
received their GEDs. Unfortunately for program enthusiasts, Georgia represented
the exception, not the rule. Five of the 10 states' programs retained fewer than half
of their enrollees; Maryland and West Virginia fared especially poorly, retaining
only 18% and 34% of their enrollees, respectively. [see Appendix VI for a state-
by-state breakdown of program results.]
Although, as noted above, the National Guard's stated goal was to have
100% of program graduates obtain their degrees, by the end of March 1994 only
73% [568 cadets] had received their diplomas. At first glance, an almost 75%
130 Dunlap, p. 65.; As mentioned previously, both Halperin and Wilson have noted that the view that all
organizations want larger budgets ignores the fact that there is often a Lradeoff between bigger budgets on
one hand, and the complexity of tasks, the number of rivals, and the multiplicity of constraints on the other
which they want to reduce. All else being equal, bigger is better than smaller, but all else is not equal. So,
sometimes organizations will opt for smaller budgets and greater control. [See Wilson, Chapter 10 and
Halperin, Bureaucracies and Foreign Policy.]
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"success rate" does not appear to be a complete failure.131 Although 73% falls far
below the Guard's official goal, their acknowledged expectation level lay closer to
an 85% GED graduation rate; thus, 73% appears to be a relatively] respectable
outcome. However, a bit of arithmetic shows just how abysmal this result truly is.
With an annual operating budget of $44 million [based on the FY93 Congressional
appropriation], and an expected operation rate of two cycles per year, we can fairly
calculate the costs of the first cycle as being half of the annual outlay, hence $22
million. With a graduating class of 568 students, the cost per student has now risen
to $38,732.40, twice the expected cost per student, and more importantly, 7.6
times more expensive than sending dropouts through GED programs offered in
neighborhood schools!
Ignoring cost-benefit concerns, however, advocates argue that a one-time
charge of $40,000 per cadet may be a small price to pay. If ChalleNGe is able to
successfully educate and reintegrate those cadets that do make it to graduation,
future expenditures on these youths may be curtailed. After all, the costs of
keeping them in prisons and/or paying their welfare checks because, as dropouts,
their prospects for employment would be slim, will likely add up to more than
$40,000. So if 568 dropouts have been "salvaged", the argument goes, this must
viewed as a triumph.
Such an argument has much to recommend it, thus, ultimately the true
success of Project ChalleNGe will be defined by how well graduates assimilate
into their school, work, and community life over the long term. But, if history
offers any lessons, we ought not be overly optimistic about expected outcomes.
Both the CCC and Project 100,000 [and, as we shall see below, other boot camp
131 Although some camps certainly were. At the Ncw York camp, which had a 55% retention rate, only
22% of cadets graduated with their GEDs. The Connecticut group highlighted above also did poorly, with
only a 43% retention rate. Further, of those who remained, only 47% received their diplomas.
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ventures] have shown us that short-term positive effects notwithstanding, long-term
prospects for permanent change seem slim.
Juvenile Boot Camps and "Challenge" Programs
Though too little time has passed to determine the long-term effects of the
Project ChalleNGe, a reasonable prediction of the likelihood of "success" can be
made by comparing ChalleNGe cadets with graduates of other boot-camp
programs. Like the ChalleNGe program, juvenile boot camp jails and "challenge
programs", such as Outward Bound, have sought to capitalize on the perceived
positive effects of military training to rehabilitate and educate "at-risk" youth. 13 2
To be fair, there are some notable differences between the Guard-run
venture and these other programs, however. Boot camp prisons are set-up as
alternative incarceration options for youthful offenders who would otherwise go to
jail; thus the impetus behind enrollees' participation is quite different from that of
ChalleNGe's cadet volunteers. On the other hand, however, the majority of
juvenile offenders accepted into boot camp prisons have backgrounds very similar
to those of the average ChalleNGe participant-- a youthful, non-violent offender
[with few, if any, prior offensesJ, often a high school dropout, frequently from a
broken home.
Moreover, while one of the goals of utilizing juvenile boot camps is the
alleviation of prison crowding, the programs' larger goals focus on education,
rehabilitation, and self-awareness [i.e., self-esteem building] training, which are, of
course, the primary goals of Project ChalleNGe. So, although one must be
cautious about drawing exact parallels between them, it is reasonable to make some
gross comparisons, in terms of success rates, between Project ChalleNGe and
132 These "challenge" programs are not to be confused with Projeci ChalleNGe.
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what are, in boot camp vernacular, commonly called "shock incarceration"
programs.
Over the past ten years, boot camp jails have proliferated throughout the
nation. The idea of"shock incarceration" [hereafter, "SI"I first arose in the late
1970s, in discussions between the Georgia Department of Corrections and a local
judge. In December 1983, Georgia opened its first boot camp. 13 3 Since that time
interest in SI program development has increased sharply. By the end of 1988, 15
SI programs were operating in nine states, and by the end of 1993, 46 programs
were in operation in 30 states, serving approximately 7500 participants per year, for
an average stay of 18 weeks. 134
Were not already obvious, the growth of SI programs alone would point to
the incredible popularity of military-styled rehabilitation programs. In many states,
due to extensive positive media coverage, a political constituency for SI has
developed. SI makes good copy by conveying themes which clearly cater to public
desires for a panacea for crime through strict discipline and deterrence. At the same
time, boot camps appeal to a number of disparate constituencies. "Hard-liners [can]
take heart that inmates [are] not lazing around prison yards, and liberals [can] take
solace in shorter prison terms and, in most states, programs [oriented] towards
rehabilitation." 13 5 Thus, not surprisingly, "the impetus for SI development
generally has not come from correction officers, but from judges, governors, and
legislators." 136 In 1989, in states where SI-related policy discussions or planning
was underway, the National Institute of Justice surveyed those involved, and asked
them to identify the individuals or groups driving the creation of the boot camps.
133 Parent, D., Shock Incarceration: An Overview of Existing Programs, Washington: National Institute
of Justice, 1989, p. 1.
134 MacKenzie, D., "Boot Camp Prisons in 1993," Nalional Institute of Justice Journal, November 1993,
pp. 21-2.
Fisher, I., "Prison Boot Camps Prove No Sure Cure," New York Times, 10 April 1994, p. 43.
1 36 Parent, p. 1.
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Two-thirds of those surveyed named legislators or the governor, while only one-
third named the Department of Corrections.13 7
Like other military-styled rehabilitation programs, boot camp SI appeals to
administrators and policymakers who have, themselves, served in the military [i.e.,
since boot camp "made men" out of them, SI can do the same for today's teenage
offenders.] And because so many of those formulating policy have themselves
been through basic training, "SI programs usually command broad, quick, and
unquestioning support. Legislators and corrections officials do not need theoretical
rationales--many feel they have an intuitive understanding of SI based on personal
experience." 13 8
About 20 percent of those surveyed by the National Institute of Justice said
they supported boot camp prisons because they thought they would be a more
effective correctional intervention than regular incarceration. The belief is that
exposure to the "intensive exercise, martial drills, and hard labor" normally
associated with military service would "shock" young offenders into changing their
ways.1 3 9 Again responding intuitively, "they believed firmly--and in some cases
fervently--that SI programs would help rehabilitate offenders and deter future
crime. Some officials indicated they had heard glowing anecdotes that claimed
success rates in excess of 97 percent for some programs." 1 40
Despite high levels of enthusiasm on the part of policymakers, examination
of existing boot camp programs shows that such exuberance is hardly justified.
The dropout rate for most programs is high, "about a quarter of the inmates fail to
complete the program and are sent to a regular jail." 141 Even at New York's
Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility, considered by experts to be the nation's
137 ibid.
138 ibid., p. 2.
139 Fisher, p. 43.
140 ibid., p. 3.
141 Fisher, p. 37.
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premier boot camp, the failure rate is high. "Although boot camp graduates do
marginally better than other inmates at first, after two years the number of offenders
who return[ed] to prison is roughly the same, around 50 percent over four
years." 14 2
Similar recidivism rate data exists for other boot camp programs. In a 1993
Georgia boot camp study, researchers found that six months after release, boot
camp participants actually had a recidivism slightly higher than those who had
served their sentence in prison [ 11.3% versus 10.3%]. Over time, boot c:amp
participants recidivated marginally less often than those who had been incarcerated,
but after four years time boot camp recidivism rates were still higher than 50%.143
In Oklahoma, where the Department of Corrections compared return rates of boot
camp graduates with similar non-violent though incarcerated] offenders, after 29
months almost half the SI graduates, but only 28 percent of those jailed, had
returned to prison. 144 These figures become even less auspicious when one
considers that many states "restrict boot camp eligibility to those persons believed
most likely to be deterred--young non-violent offenders who have not yet been
confined under sentence." 145
Equally unfavorable results have surtaced from other military-styled
rehabilitative physical and/or educational progranms. These so-called "challenge
programs," "try [like ChalleNGe I to rehabilitate offenders by increasing their self-
esteem, self-control, and respect for authority by exposing them to vigorous
142 ibid.
143 Prison Boot Camps: Short Term Costs Reduced, but Long-Term Impact Uncertain, Washington,
D.C.: General Accounting Office, April 1993, p. 29.; In Skock Incarceration: An Overview of Existing
Programs, another Georgia study is cited. In this study, the Georgia Department of Corrections found that
38.5 percent of their boot camp graduates returned to prison within 36 months. Of the boot camp graduates
who had been in their teens when admitted, 46.8 percent returned to prison within three years of release. [It
should be emphasized that neither of these studies involved carefully constructed comparison groups, and so
one should be cautious about placing too much faith in these results. Furthermore, neither the GAO report
nor the NIJ report reveals the margin of error for its results.]
144 Parent, p. 4.
145 ibid., p. 3.
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physical and mental challenges." 14 6 Such programs have typically been used for
older juvenile offenders, and though [like the CCC and Project 100,000] they seem
to be successful at increasing participants' self-esteem and confidence, as the
following studies illustrate, they have been markedly less successful at keeping
them permanently out of trouble.
For instance, in one study of the progress of all graduates of Florida's Short
Term Elective Placement [S.T.E.P.J program for juvenile delinquents, it was
found that 31.3 percent of the youths recidivated within 12 months of release from
the STEP program. As expected, first-time offenders were more successful than
those previously committed [59.2% versus 35.7% I. Females fared better than
males, and rural youths fared better than their urban counterparts. Neither offense
type nor the offender's race seemed to have an impact on recidivism. 14 7
Another study focused on community-based DSO alternative incarceration
options for juvenile status offenders. Their results provided few surprises but
strongly support the conclusions reaciled by similar studies. 14 8 As should be
expected, recidivism rates seem most directly correlated with client characteristics.
In other words, what one brought to the program--history of prior offenses, age,
sex, family background--was the most significant predictor of eventual
outcomes. 14 9
146 ibid., Appendix C, p. 57.; While no unified theory of juvenile delinquency exists, it is commonly
believed that delinquents suffer from deficiencies in problem-solving skills and from dysfunctional views of
self; "challenge" programs are thus designed to aid participants in overcoming these personal and
psychological deficits.
147 ibid., p. 58.
148 Kobrin, S., Community Treatment of Juvenile Offenders: the DSO Experiments, Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1983, p. 200.; After six months, there appeared to be no significant difference in recidivism
rates between their experimental and control groups. In act, overall, "the analysis shows a moderately
deleterious impact--higher recidivism rates at six months--attributable to program participation."
149 In short, the study suggests that programs catering to predominantly older male offenders with no prior
offenses can expect a favorable outcome, in terms of recidivism rates. The outcome can be expected to be
less positive if the population in question has a high proportion of females, younger males, and, in either
of these categories, they have many prior offenses. [For more details, see the chapter entitled "Client
Recidivism and Program Components," pp. 182-7.1
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More importantly, for the purposes of this paper, however, is the fact that
type of services provided to offenders seemed to be the least effective predictor of
success. Similarly, site [i.e. service facilities] as a program component displayed
"only a marginal and tenuous relationship" to recidivism. "Variation in recidivism
was apparently unaffected by such facility characteristics as level of staff
professionalism, the use of volunteers or paraprofessionals, the diversity of
services offered, or the use of coercive authority in treating status offenders." 1 50
Again, though these findings should be viewed with caution--the study's authors
note that it was difficult to operationalize the variables--the findings are nonetheless
of sufficient potential importance, and further indicate that one ought to be wary of
very optimistic assessments of what these programs can accomplish, whether they
are managed by the military or by civilians.
Clearly, one should be cautious about directly comparing recidivism rates of
programs that are substitutes for jail with a expected success rates for program such
as Project ChalleNGe. However, the survey of programs described above were
quite varied in their orientation and methods, while at the same time, they shared
some crucial similarities with the ChalleNGe program. As mentioned above, all of
the programs reviewed herein focused, for the most part, on non-violent juvenile
offenders, often dropouts with dysfunctional family backgrounds--which makes the
profile of a typical participant quite similar to the typical ChlalleNGe cadet.
Likewise, boot camps, "challenge" programs, and the community-based DSO
programs all stress what are viewed as the positive aspects of the military milieu--
an emphasis on discipline, structure, hard [physical and mental] labor, and self-
esteem enhancement. Furthermore, a majority of these programs also stressed
educational remediation and advancement, w hich again sounds quite similar to the
advantages and goals now being touted by the National Guard.
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Thus, though we cannot apply the recidivism results of other programs to
an expected outcome of ChalleNGe without qualification, we should not fail to
appreciate the insights such a comparison can provide. These results, coupled with
ChalleNGe's marginal first cycle performance and the historical case studies
examined, point to a very simple conclusion--we should abandon attempts to
mandate military involvement in youth remediation and rehabilitation programs.
Yet, despite of the plethora of evidence weighing against the institution of such
programs, new military-dependent proposals continue to appear. Both politically
and psychologically, Americans seem to be smitten with the idea of using the
military as a welfare provider. Why is this the case, and can we ever hope to break
out of this destructive and costly social cycle'?
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IV. The Military as Welfare Provider: an American Addiction?
While contemporary programs mirror neither the CCC nor Project 100,000
exactly, they share a number of similarities. Each program aimed to ameliorate a
domestic social crisis involving disadvantaged youths, through utilization of the
skills, logistical talents, and disciplinary traditions of the military. Close
examination of the historical evidence has revealed that neither the CCC or Project
100,000 were as successful as their advocates have alleged, and with Project
ChalleNGe it seems we destined to repeat the mistakes of the past. Why, in the
face of so much evidence to the contrary, are Americans--a population, according to
many scholars, who, by virtue of their liberal tradition, are naturally anti-military--
consistently drawn to the idea of employing the military as a catalyst for social
reform? Likewise, what makes this institution, a supposed bedrock of social
conservatism, the persistent choice for the role of vanguard of social change?1 5 1
The fact is that there are two major flaws in conventional "wisdom" about
the military and the way in which Americans view it. Firstly, the armed services
are not nearly so resistant to change as is often assumed, and secondly, Americans
display great confidence in the military's honesty, organizational prowess, and
efficiency, and as a whole, are much more pro-military than many scholars would
have us believe.
Far from the monolithic ideological institution resistant to change within
itself, as described by Janowitz in The Professional Soldier, the military has often
led American society in terms of social change. In fact, the civilian sector has often
failed to keep pace with the achievements of the military in at least two areas: racial
discrimination and sexual discrimination. 152 While progress has not always been
15 1[For details of this argument, see Huntington, The Soldier and the State and/or Janowitz, M., The
Professional Soldier.]
152 While this point should be not be interpreted to mean that the military has invariably been more
socially conscious than society as a whole, examination of the Civil War period provides a number of
examples of how certain segments of the military have proved more progressive than the government they
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as even or rapid as many would like, as sociologist Charles Moskos says, " blacks
occupy more management positions in the military than in business, education,
government, or any other significant sector of society."1 5 3 The Joint Center for
Political and Economic Studies concurs [as noted above], "the military has gone
farther than any other public or private institution in practicing equal
opportunity." 154
The military has also led the charge in the area of women's rights. In the
civilian sector, only three of every 100 top executive jobs are held by women, and
this figure has not changed substantially in the last decade. Female executives earn
only 68 percent as their male colleagues. In the military, on the other hand, females
account for ten percent of the active duty personnel, and 12 percent hold the rank of
lieutenant colonel or above. While these numbers do not adequately reflect the
makeup of society as a whole, they outshine the statistics for the civilian sector. 155
Moskos agrees, "the evidence clearly shows that when it comes to equal
opportunities, the once rigidly segregated and male-dominated Armed Forces are
clearly in advance of comparable civilian institutions. 15 6
This fact is not lost on the American public, who in recent polls have
expressed an unprecedented degree of confidence in the military as an institution.
The most recent, a Harris poll taken in March 1993, asked Americans (as they have
each year since 1960) whether or not they "have a great deal of confidence" in
various institutions. On a scale between one and 100 percent, the military received
a score of 57 percent--a 27 year high.15 7 This score lies in stark contrast with
served. [For details, see Armstead Robinson's "Not North of Dixie's Line," in Cunliffe, M. [ed.], Soldiers
and Civilians, pp. 117-35.]
153 Brant, LL Col. Bruce, "Vanguards of Social Change?," Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, KS,
February 1993, p. 13.
154 ibid.
155 Brant, p. 14
156 ibid.
157 Correll, J., "Opinions," Air Force Magazine, June 1993, p.2 7 .
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confidence ratings given to the White House and Congress in the Harris poll, 23
percent and 12 percent respectively. Other polls have given the military still higher
ratings. A February 1991 Gallup Poll, for example, showed that "public
confidence in the military soared to 85 percent, far surpassing every other
institution in our society." 158 and a heretofore unpublished 1991 Roper poll gave a
78% favorable assessment of the military, again far exceeding the rating given to
any other institution or agency. 159
In his book The Confidence Gap, Seymour Lipset hypothesizes a general
decline in the amount of faith Americans place in institutions. Lipset asserts that this
decline can be traced to many factors, including the way in which the media
presents the news, a series of (apparently) inadequate U.S. Presidents, and a sense
of malaise, attributable to the United States' relative decline as superpower. While
his hypotheses seem to be intuitively correct, polling data suggests that Lipset's
hypothesis is incomplete. 16 0 It is true that confidence in civilian government
entities, departments, and agencies has declined markedly in the last ten years, but
confidence in the military had changed little before 1991, remaining at least as high
as the best-rated civilian bodies. The Department of Education, for example, has
fallen to its lowest point in nearly a decade.161 Likewise, the private sector has
suffered a decline in public confidence. Between 1968 and 1981, the number of
people who felt business could be trusted to strike a fair balance between profit and
the interests of the public declined by a full 51 percent. 162
158 Dunlap, "The Origins of the Coup...," Parameters, Vol. XXII, No. 4, Winter 1992-3, p. 5,
159 Unpublished Roper poll data, 1991. The military's score was undoubtedly given a boost by the Gulf
War, but, at the same time, the role of the war should not be overestimated as the Harris poll data indicates
an approval rating that was even seven points higher in 1993, two years after the war ended.
16 0 Lipset, S and Schneider, W., The Confidence Gap, New York: The Free Press, See chapters
1, 2, & 5.
161 Correll, p. 27.
1 6 2 Lipset and Schneider, p. 183.
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It is not surprising that many Americans, having lost faith in both civilian
government agencies and the private sector, find attractive the idea of employing the
military to help solve social ills, especially those directly tied to racial and social
inequalities (like those to be addressed by Project ChalleNGe). Even commentator
and journalist James Fallows, previously a harsh critic of the military, has adopted
the view that the military may be our last best hope. He now views the military as
the "one government institution that has been assigned the legitimacy to act on its
notion of the common good." 16 3 Fallows goes on to say, "I am beginning to think
that the only way the national government can do anything worthwhile is to invent a
security threat and turn the job over to the military." 164 As polling data shows,
Fallows is not alone in his view.
A telling comparison is revealed by comparing public confidence in the
military and the public's impression of the Departments of Education and Health
and Human Services, two organizations which presumably would control programs
like Project ChalleNGe, were they not managed by the military. As noted
previously, in the 1991 Roper poll, those expressing a favorable opinion of the
military numbered 78%. Those who were favorably inclined towards the
Department of Health and Human Services totaled only 52%, and those favorably
disposed towards the Department of Education were but 48% of those polled.165
Small wonder, then, that policy makers are inclined to turn these missions over to
the military.
Finally, we must consider the possibility that the reason that politicians cast
such a covetous eye towards the military is that they view this very successful and
highly respected organization as a panacea for social ills, for which they are
163 Rinaldo, Lt. Col. Richard J., "The Army as Part of the PCacC Dividend," Military Review, February
1993, p. 46.
164 Fallows, J., "Military Efficiency," T'he Atlantic Monthly, August 1991, p. 18.
165 Unpublished Roper poll data, 1991.
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unwilling to make the hard choices required to truly solve. Perhaps policymakers
hope [in vain] that the military will step in to reintegrate dropouts and reform
juvenile delinquents because they find it too politically painful to attempt to come to
grips with the economic and social problems that give rise to these structural
failures in the first place.
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V. Conclusions and Some Recommendations
Twice before in this century, and again today, policymakers have called
upon the U.S. military to act as a social welfare agency for underprivileged youth.
Though many outside the military herald the CCC and Project 100,000 as evidence
that the military can cure domestic ills. to embrace such an opinion is to ignore the
lessons, not to mention the details of these historical initiatives. Military-youth
development programs adversely affect the operational readiness of our armed
forces, are prodigiously expensive, and have proven to be of little sustainable value
to those youth who are truly "at-risk," no matter how much money is spent.
Project ChalleNGe has been born amidst disillusionment with the excesses
of the last decade, a seemingly endless array of political scandals, and a marked
decline in our nation's economic resources. Yet opposing this disillusionment is a
general appreciation for the efficiency, material resources, and skills of our armed
forces, buoyed by recent successes in the field and substantial rebuilding in the
1980s [and reinforced with the romanticized notions of military service, held by
many policymakers]. In this era of disillusionment, the lure of calling upon our
country's remaining respected and well-equipped institution to address the problem
of "at-risk" youth is seductive; however, we must resist this "call to armns."
Previous attempts to employ the military in such endeavors were only marginally
successful in their own time, so attempting to model modern proposals on past
programs of dubious reputation is ill-considered.
Granted, the military has proven a route to success for myriad
disadvantaged youths. But those the military has voluntarily taken have been
selectively culled from the population at large. Though our armed services have
embraced "disadvantaged" recruits, the men and women chosen have been the best
and the brightest of our nation's underprivileged. There have, of course, been
periods when this selectivity has not been enforced. Project 100,000 is an obvious
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example. The experience of the New Standards Men should have signaled the
danger of lowering standards, but in the aftermath of VietNam, with the advent of
the All-Volunteer Force in the early 1970s, military entry requirements and
behavioral standards were relaxed. Not surprisingly, the quality and morale of our
armed forces declined measurably. With the re-elevation of standards and
requirements in the 1980s, we again became an enviable fighting force.
But, assimilating low-quality recruits into the ranks is but one way in which
the military can be adversely affected by a role as welfare provider. By distracting
the military from its primary mission, we threaten operational capabilities, while
simultaneously eroding the organizational culture that has made this institution so
estimable. The U.S. military has been successful because it is composed of a select
group that, imbued with a clear sense of mission, has, for the most part, been
allowed to concentrate on its raison d'8tre, national security.
Expecting the military to prove equally successful at redeeming America's
"at-risk" youth is to ignore the deleterious effects of forcing the military to adopt a
mission that lies outside of its defined mandate. From an operational readiness
standpoint, such missions reduce the time and resources devoted to military training
and preparations. 1 66 From the standpoint of organizational culture, military-youth
development missions lead to a deterioration of morale and sense of purpose.
Besides, to expect the military to enthusiastically embrace the military-youth
mission is, quite frankly, wishful thinking. Neither past programs nor current
166 Certainly, one can argue that in the post-Cold War world, potential threats are smaller and less
dangerous than before the thaw in international relations. Moreover, the U.S. is becoming ever less likely
to intervene in any crisis that does not menace our country directly. [See Sapolsky, H. and Weiner, S.,
"War Without Killing," Breakthroughs. .. ] Thus, re-routing military resources onto the domestic front
may seem like an acceptable idea. Yet, as General Dunlap has noted, in periods of military drawdown, it
becomes more, not less, important for those forces remaining to devote their energies to preserving and
enhancing operational readiness. In short, when militaries shrink, they need to getter leaner and meaner, not
smaller and more diverse, as they will no longer be able to simply rely on sheer size to overwhelm the
enemy. [See Dunlap, Jr., C., "The Last American Warrior: Non-Traditional Missions and the Decline of
the U.S. Armed Forces," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 
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proposals can boast the enthusiastic participation of either the leaders or the
members of our nation's armed forces.
Even when military-sponsored and/or military-styled programs do come
into existence, they are costly and provide few, if any, long-term benefits for their
participants. Training, when it has existed at all, has focused on low-skill
vocations, or on jobs that have no civilian equivalents. Moreover, though instilling
the martial values of hard work, discipline, and self-esteem sounds very appealing
in the abstract, evidence does not bear out claims that imbuing troubled youth with
such values will permanently change their behavior. Salvaging "at-risk" youth is
difficult for any organization, civilian or otherwise. As history has clearly shown
us, relying on the military is no panacea.
In the 1930s, the CCC only proved to be a durable "success" because the
advent of World War II saved camp graduates from an imminent return to the
unemployment lines. Thirty years later, McNa;m.ara's New Standards Men did not
profit similarly from their own wartime experience. Neither their participation in
the VietNam war, nor their tenure in the military, in general, seems to have
provided them with any long-term benefits; by most indices of "success," the NSM
have fared poorly. 16 7 And in the 1990s, with Project ChalleNGe and other similar
programs, we seem destined to repeat past mistakes.
Perhaps, this seems an overly harsh appraisal of past and present military-
youth programs. The "best and the brightest" of youth program participants will
likely graduate and become reintegrated into society. For the truly "marginal," on
the other hand, finite exposure [i.e., 22 weeks] to a program of military discipline
and physical activity will hardly undo a lifetime of dysfunction. As has been noted,
the majority of program participants are barely literate, many have extensive
167 There is even speculation that the NSM are a significant part ol the "VietNam veterans problem" that
still plagues our nation nearly two decades after the hall of Saigon. Perhaps many of those Army jacketed,
[seemingly] hard-core homeless that one finds on street comers in every major U.S. metropolis are the
legacy of McNamara's ill-fated experiment.
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criminal records, and are products of broken homes. Though it would be
wonderful if the military could truly change the lives of these youths, expecting
such a result is like chasing a chimera.
However, this is not to imply that the U.S. military can never be an
effective force in the area of youth development. Servicemen, as individuals,
should pursue these same goals, as volunteers in their own communities. On a
much more private, much less public level, members of the military should take part
in these efforts because, as individuals, they may truly be able to impart some of
their knowledge and experience to those who seek mentorship and guidance. In
addition, the non-institutionalized use of volunteers will likely alter participants'
views of these programs. If juveniles know, for instance, that a serviceman is
volunteering, and not simply participating in the program as part of his or her job,
the youths will likely place greater value on that person's input. In short, juveniles
who possess the requisite motivation to succeed after participating is a military-style
program would also respond to a community-based program, and with greater
economy.
In a similar vein, removing these projects from our defense budget would
free resources for use in the private sector, both to aid economic growth and to
address social problems directly--all without impairing the integrity of the military.
As one policy analyst stated, "Put bluntly, if we have a lot of people in uniform
with time to rebuild public housing and teach school, they should be working as
civilians in the construction or education industries."168
Finally, despite American policymakers' predisposition to don "rose-
colored glasses" when evaluating military-youth programs, there may yet be a
reason to hope that political initiatives forcing military intervention may be
abandoned. Though these proposals are currently popular, over time we should
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168 Bandow, p. 19
expect growing resistance by organizations, such as schools, prisons, and
government agencies, that may be negatively impacted if the military adopts the
missions these civilian organizations have traditionally called their own. As the
scale of military-youth programs grows, the military will become functional [and in
the case of government agencies, allocational] rivals of existing organizations. 169
Although small projects, such as ChalleNGe might not be viewed as a real
threat, the large-scale programs envisioned by many policymakers will inevitably
call into question the continued need for some of the aforementioned organizations.
Few, if any, bureaucratic organizations surrender their autonomy, and especially
their very existence, without a struggle. Faced with their own mortality, threatened
organizations will likely unite in opposition to military-youth programs. Hence,
these programs may fail in the end, not because of concern for our military, and not
because of concern for those the programs are supposed to help, but because of
bureaucratic resistance and the concerns of policymakers who fear a political
backlash from those constituencies threatened by program implementation.
Although rational evaluation may not instigate a reevaluation of military-youth
assistance proposals, perhaps political self-interest will.
16 9 Functional rivals are "other agencies whose social functions are competitive with those of the bureau
itself," while allocational rivals are "those other agencies who compete with it'for resources, regardless of
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APPENDIX I: Percentage of New Standards Men and
Offenses in Service (22-24 Months of Service)70
Control Group Men Committing
Non Judicial Punishment a Court Martial Convictionsb
New New
Service: Standards Conrol Standards Control
Army 18.1 10.3 3.2 1.6
Navy 6.9 3.5 1.0 0.3
Marine Corps 23.8 18.2 5.3 4.7
Air Force 4.1 1.4 0.2 c
a Light punishment and other corrective measures imposed by a commanding officer for minor offenses and
rules infractions.
b Includes special, summary, and general court-martial convictions.
c Less than 0.05%
APPENDIX II: Effect of Military Experience on Post-Service Career as Viewed by the
Project 100,000 Sample, by Race and Educational Status 171
Heled Hur No Effect
Characteristic Na % Na % Na %
Race:
Nonblack 88 45.4 23 11.9 83 42.8
Black 59 58.4 17 16.8 25 24.8
Educational Status
at Entr:
Nongraduate 64 40.8 30 19.1 63 40.1
HSgraduate 83 60.1 10 7.2 45 32.6
TOTAL 147 49.8 40 13.6 108 36.6
a Data are unweighted.
1 70 Adapted from Laurence and Ramsberger, p. 49
171 ibid., p. 124. .
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APPENDIX III: Reasons for Helpful Effects of Military Service on Post-Service
Career as Reported by Project 100,000 Sampleb, by Education and Race 172
How Military . ,
Hel Career By Education: By Race:
Nongraduate HS Graduate Nonblack Black Tal
N a Na % Na % Na %
-- -- . _2 .52 2.5 2 2.3 -- 2 1.4
Maturity 26 40.6 29 35.8 33 38.4 22 37.2 55 37.9
7.9
Discipline 4 6.2 11 13.6 9 10.5 6 10.2 15 10.3
Ed. Assistance 6 9.5 4 4.9 9 10.5 1 1.6 10 6.9
Training 12 18.7 25 30.9 15 17.4 22 37.3 37 25.5
Motivation 2 3.1 -- -- 2 2.3 -- -- 2 1.4
Other 14 21.9 10 12.3 16. 18.6 8 13.6 24 16.5
TOTAL 64 100% 81 100% 86 100% 145 100%
Note: The question asked was, "All things considered, do you think that your entire period of military
service, including Reserve or Guard Duty, has helped, hurt, or had no eflfct on your career?" Those who
responded positively were then asked, "Why do you think it has helped?"
a Data are unweighted.
b Entire sample had been separated from service at time olf survey.
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APPENDIX IV: Status Dropout Rates for Persons 16 through 19 by State(1990)a:




















































a National Average (11.2%).
SOURCE: 1991 Decennial Census and The Digest of Educational Statistics 1992.
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APPENDIX V: National Guard's Official Goals for Project ChalleNGe
Program Ohiectives to Support Mission
1] Socialization Process: Participants can develop positive self image and
discipline, motivation, and identity with community necessary to function as a
contributing member of society.
2] To enhance participants educational skills, instill desire to continue self-
improvement, and teach values and life skills required to succeed on the job and
within the community.
3] To integrate program graduates into larger community through assistance with
employment and educational efforts.
4] To provide mentorship services after graduation.
Program Goals
11 80% of cadets graduate from residential pluhse (22 weeks long).
2] Cadet education: 100% of cadets enroll either in a GED program, or re-enroll in
high school upon completion of the residential phase.
31 85% of cadets complete either the GED, or obtain a high school diploma.
Cadet Development
11 100% of cadets demonstrate growth in self-discipline and personal
responsibility.
21 100% of graduates will demonstrate growth in human relations and skills.
Post-Residential Phase Goals
1] 100% of graduates placed within education or employment within 30 days.
2] 100% of cadets remain free of criminal activity and substance abuse in the post-
residential phase
Post Program Goal
1] 80% of cadets retain placement and remain free of criminal activity and
substance abuse for 6 months.
Information herein provided by the National Guard Bureau, 1992.
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ChalleNGe Class #1-93 State Performance [Inau ral Cycle ParticipantResults]
COL COL2 COL3 COL4 COL5 COL 6 COL7 COL8 COL9 COL 10
Student Student
Retention Retention
% Against % Against
Perform. Enrollmt. Enrollmt. Initial Student Initial Graduatn. GED
State Average % Target Target Enrollmt. Backfill Enrollmt. Enrollmt. GEDGrads Gradl%
Arizona 79q% 108 71% 110 0 709% 77 67 87%
Arkansas 56% 100 509% 105 15 48% 50 31 62%
Conn. 42% 200 38% 176 0 43% 75 35 47%
Georgia 89% 144 81% 144 12 81% 116 112 97%
Illinois 72% 300 64% 199 97 96% 192 153 80%
Louisiana 699% 200 59% 185 0 63% 117 92 79%
Marland 50% 115 24% 160 25 18% 28 21 75%
New York 38% 100 55% 118 0 47% 55 12 22%
Oklahoma 73% 60 709%6 61 5 69% 42 32 76%
W. Va. 46% 68 32% 64 0 34% 22 13 59%
'AIS 64% 1395 55% 1322 154 59% 774 568 73%
.Performance Average=Student Retention % Against Enrollment Target plus GED Grad % divided by 2.
-Student Retention% Against Enrollment Target=Graduation Enrollment divided by Enrollment Target
·Student Retention % Against Initial Enrollment=Graduation Enrollment divided by Initial Enrollment
GED Grad%=GED Grads divided by Graduation Enrollment
Data Provided by National Guard Bureau of the United States, current as of 24 March 1994.
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